

Evaluation Profile¹



South Sudan (2009-2010 to 2013-2014)

Development Evaluation Division
Strategic Policy Branch
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD)

¹ Note – this document is only to be used or referenced for the purposes of this evaluation exercise.

General Acknowledgements

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Front cover - Map of South Sudan from <http://www.wisn.com/national/U-N-48-killed-at-South-Sudan-base/25548750>

² South Sudan CPE Statistical Profile 2009 – 2014, prepared by DFATD CFO Branch Statistical Data Analysis Unit (see EDRMS #7011050).

³ Note- South Sudan Country Program refers to xCIDA (i.e. development) operations, not xDFAIT.

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1. Purpose of the Profile

This paper provides a background profile on the former CIDA and DFATD's investments in South Sudan. The information provided in this document will facilitate the design of an independent evaluation that will assess the performance of DFATD's South Sudan Program over fiscal years (FY 2009-2010 to FY 2013-2014), recognizing that the South Sudan program was not officially established until 2011, so that programming that targeted South Sudan (but was part of the Sudan program at the time) will be utilized for the purposes of the evaluation.

This Profile describes the context in which the South Sudan Country Program was implemented and examines DFATD's investment in South Sudan for the period under review.

This paper is largely based on the DFATD *draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016)*, the *draft South Sudan Country Development Strategy (2013-2018)*, the *Sudan Country Development Programming Framework (2009-2014)* and *Sudan Country Strategy (2009)*, the *Global Peace and Security Fund Multi-Year Strategic Framework for Sudan (2009-2013)* - START, official data provided by the Statistical Analysis and Reporting unit of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Branch, as well as grey literature.⁴

2. Background to the South Sudan Program

2.1 Context

Bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the East, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south and the Central African Republic to the west, the Republic of South Sudan covers an area of 644 square km, slightly smaller than France.

With a population of 10.8 million, the population density is less than one tenth that of Uganda.⁵ More than 83% of the population lives in rural areas; almost three-quarters of the population is under the age of 30;⁶ and more than half of the population is living below the national poverty line (based on the monetary value of consumption needed to fulfil basic needs).⁷ Population growth and the number of young people entering the labour market is outpacing employment growth. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan affirms that as many as 85% of the population "adhere to traditional belief systems," with the balance being Christian and a "very small percentage of Muslims."⁸ However, the US Department of State's 2012 Annual International Religious Freedom Report maintains that the majority of the population is Christian, with Muslims accounting for between 18 – 35% of the population; most of those believing in traditional systems living scattered (and isolated) in the rural areas.⁹ The indigenous people of South Sudan are divided into three broad ethnic groups, the Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and the South Western Sudnaic,¹⁰ as well as sixty different sub groups¹¹ with the largest being the Dinka (representing about a

⁴ South Sudan CPE Statistical Profile 2009 – 2014, prepared by DFATD CFO Branch Statistical Data Analysis Unit (see EDRMS #7011050).

⁵ World Bank, "South Sudan: Country at a Glance," <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan> (Retrieved January 22, 2015).

⁶ The population is very young, with 16% under the age of five-years old, 32% under the age of ten, 51% under the age of 18 and 72% under the age of 30.3. World Bank, "South Sudan Overview," 10 October 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> (Retrieved January 22, 2015)

⁷ World Bank, "South Sudan Overview."

⁸ Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan, Washington DC, "Religion", 2011, <http://www.southsudanembassydc.org/inner.asp?z=5D58> (Retrieved January 22, 2015)

⁹ United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, "South Sudan 2012 International Religious Freedom Report," 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208410.pdf> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

¹⁰ Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan, Washington DC, "Languages," 2011, <http://www.southsudanembassydc.org/map.asp#sthash.9K6hA0sd.dpuf> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

¹¹ The Nilotic people include the Dinka, Nuer, Shiluk (Collo), Murle, Kachiopo, Jie, Anyuak, Acholi, Maban, Kuma, Lou (Jur), Bango, Bai, Gollo, Endri, Forgee, Chod (Jur), Khara, Ngorgule, Forugi, Siri, Benga, Agar, Pakam, Gok, Ciec, Aliap, Hopi, Guere, Atuot, Appak, Lango, Pari, Otuho and Ajaa. Nilo-Hamitic groups include the Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Pojula, Nyangwara, Kuku, Latuko, Lokoya, Toposa, Buya, Lopit, Tennen and

quarter of the population¹²), the Nuer and the Shilluk.¹³ The major languages are English, Arabic, Juba Arabic and Dinka.

Ethnic conflict, based on access to limited resources, has long historical roots in South Sudan. Before independence the conflict was primarily between the “south” (largely Christians/animists) and the “north” (largely Muslim). Since independence, however, recent conflicts between the Dinka and Nuer revealed long-standing unresolved issues regarding land, access rights for herders and, more recently, access to oil and mineral resources.¹⁴

South Sudan is Africa’s newest country, having gained its independence on July 9, 2011 based on a peaceful referendum, as agreed to in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).¹⁵ This followed a protracted civil war between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south, and the Government of the Republic of Sudan (GORS) in the north. An ongoing unresolved dispute between Sudan and South Sudan regarding the territorial boundaries of the oil-producing region of Abeyi has the potential to re-ignite hostilities between the two countries.¹⁶

Following decades of conflict, the new Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) that emerged from the referendum faced significant political, economic, social, and human rights challenges (including gender specific human rights violations, i.e. early forced marriages, violations driven by discriminatory customary law practices against women and girls), made more significant in the absence of formal institutions, rules or administrative structures. After only two and a half years of post-conflict state-building, where great strides were made to establish core governance and civil service functions including an extremely effective Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP),¹⁷ the country found itself again in **conflict** following a power struggle and **political divisions** between the President (Salva Kiir Mayardit), a Dinka, and his Vice President (Riek Machar) a Nuer, both of whom were former members of the SPLM.¹⁸ Growing tensions within the higher ranks of the SPLM throughout 2013, as well as armed violence in certain areas of South Sudan – notably Jonglei State – prior to the eruption of the conflict in December 2013, were also harbingers for more wide-spread conflict in the future.¹⁹

Dingira. The South-Western Sudanic groups include Kresh, Balanda, Banda, Ndogo, Zande, Madi, Olubo, Murus, Mundu, Baka, Avukaya and Makaraka.

¹² “On Your Tractor, If You Can,” *The Economist*, 06 May 2010,

<http://www.economist.com/node/16068960#channel=f1fecbd8bd6fa55&origin=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.economist.com> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

¹³ BBC News Africa, “South Sudan Profile,” 06 August 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

¹⁴ Carol Berger, “Old Enmities in the Newest Nation: Behind the Fighting in South Sudan,” *The New Yorker*, 23 January 2014,

<http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/old-enmities-in-the-newest-nation-behind-the-fighting-in-south-sudan> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

¹⁵ Concurrently with the signing of the CPA in 2005, the SPLM/A enacted the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. The CPA granted Southern Sudan regional autonomy, in the form of the Government of Southern Sudan. The president of Southern Sudan was made the first vice-president of the Republic of Sudan, and a share of national wealth was given to the southern region. The CPA stipulated that after a six-year interim period, the south would vote in a referendum on self-determination to decide whether to remain united or become independent

¹⁶ There are risks of conflict between two tribal groups (Khartoum-aligned Misseriya and the Juba-aligned Ngok Dinka) over the scheduling of the much delayed referendum for the entire region to decide whether to join Sudan or South Sudan, accentuated by the unilateral (but unrecognized) referendum vote by the Dinka in October 2013. The efforts of the African Union to mediate have not been well received by those living in Abeyi, nor was the dismissal of the Abeyi cabinet minister by President Kiir in October 2013.

Yousif Eltahir, Suwareh Darbo and Kabbashi Suliman, “Sudan,” *Africa Economic Outlook*, 25 August 2014,

<http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/> (Retrieved May 20, 2014)

¹⁷ Marcus Cox and Ken Robson, “Mid-Term Evaluation of the Budget Strengthening Initiative,” *Agulhas*, 02 July 2013,

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/298733/Mid-term-evaluation-ODI-budget-strengthening-initiative.pdf (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

¹⁸ In July 2013 President Kiir dismissed all of his ministers, including Vice President Machar, in order to “reduce the size” of government. Machar, concerned about the slide to dictatorship, stated his intention to challenge Kiir for the presidency. On December 14-15, 2013, conflict between the two erupted, with Kiir accusing Machar of coup d’etat, while Machar denied being involved though he is now seen as the leader of the rebel movement.

¹⁹ Daniel Maxwell and Martina Santschi, *From Post-Conflict Recovery and State Building to a Renewed Humanitarian Emergency: A Brief Reflection on South Sudan*, *Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium*, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (London: ODI, 2014), p.1, http://www.securelivelihoods.org/publications_details.aspx?resourceid=320 (Accessed January 26, 2015)

Alex De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan,” *African Affairs* 113, Issue 452 (2014), p.361, p.365.

United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), *Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State*, June 2012, p.i, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4feac8632.html> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

South Sudan is a “Fragile State” which means that the government lacks the political will or capacity to fulfil the basic conditions for poverty reduction, development, security and human rights.²⁰ In other words, the state of South Sudan does not have the capacity to carry out the basic functions of governing its population and territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society.²¹ Based on the “Fragility Spectrum” agreed to by the **g7+** in Kinshasa in November 2013, South Sudan is in **Stage 1: Crisis**, which is characterized by conflict, major political divisions, weak rule of law, fragmented security sector with widespread human rights abuses, tenuous provision of basic services by the government (with the international community providing emergency relief), corruption and a severely constrained economic structure owing to poor natural resources management and low government revenues.²² In this context according to the **g7+**, “...sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery.”²³

2.2 Political and Governance Context

The transitional constitution for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS), which came into force on July 9, 2011, established a presidential system of government headed by a President (who is the head of state, head of government and commander in chief of the armed forces and is elected directly by the population) supported by a cabinet and 29 ministries,²⁴ a bicameral legislature (comprised of an upper house called the Council of States²⁵ and a lower house called the National Legislative Assembly)²⁶ and a judiciary (comprised of a supreme court, courts of appeal, high courts, county courts and other courts, appointed by the President). South Sudan has never had a national election, though there were plans to hold one in 2015. Although there are at least 10 political parties,²⁷ the National Legislative Assembly is comprised largely of SPLM members,²⁸ 27% of whom were women.²⁹ Executive power is quite extensive without effective legislative and judicial counterweights.

The South Sudan legal system is a blend of statutory and customary laws; customary courts³⁰ have concurrent jurisdiction, often operating alongside statutory courts. Given that a customary court’s

²⁰ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” 2007, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates/> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

²¹ OECD, “Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility,” 08 February 2011, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/supporting-statebuilding-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264074989-en (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

²² **g7+**, *Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum*, (Kinshasa, 2013), p.10.

<http://static.squarespace.com/static/5212dafbe4b0348bfd22a511/t/52a6bc4ee4b00b9d58fba50a/1386658894692/06112013%20English%20Fraility%20Spectrum%20Note.pdf> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

²³ **g7+**, *Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum*, p.10.

²⁴ Cabinet Affairs; Defence and Veteran Affairs; Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; National Security, Justice; Interior; Parliamentary Affairs; Finance and Economic Planning; Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development; Commerce, Industry and Investment; Information and Broadcasting; Health; Agriculture and Forestry; Roads and Bridges; Transport; General Education and Instruction; Higher Education, Science and Technology; Environment; Housing and Physical Planning; Telecommunication and Postal Services; Petroleum and Mining; Electricity and Dams; Gender, Child and Social Welfare; Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management; Water Resources and Irrigation; Wildlife Conservation and Tourism; Animal Resources and Fisheries; and Culture, Youth and Sports.

²⁵ Comprised of representatives from state assemblies, the role of the Council of States is to initiate legislation in the interest of states and the principle of decentralization.

²⁶ The current National Assembly is composed of all the members of the former Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), former members of the National Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Sudan elected from constituencies in Southern Sudan, and members appointed under Article 94 (2:b) of the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. The National Legislative Assembly is elected in a national general election from the constituencies as defined by the National Election Law.

²⁷ African People’s Progressive Alliance (APPA), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - Democratic Change, Labour Party South Sudan - LPSS, United Democratic Front, South Sudan Democratic Forum, Sudan African National Union, South Sudan Liberal Party, South Sudan Communist Party, United South Sudan Party (USSP)

²⁸ SPLM (160); SPLM DC (4); Independents (6).

Government of the Republic of South Sudan, “Honourable Members,” 2014, <http://www.goss.org/index.php/legislative-assembly/honourable-members> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

²⁹ In elections, there is a separate women’s-list to fulfill the constitutional requirement of having at least twenty-five percent (25%) female members of parliament (this also applies to state elections).

Global Database of Quotas for Women, “South Sudan – Country Overview,” 07 April 2014, <http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=SS> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

³⁰ Customary courts are presided over by traditional authorities and rule according to the customary laws of their respective ethnic groups. More than 90% of disputes are handled by customary courts.

decisions can be appealed to a statutory court, two different legal systems may be applied to a single dispute. The effects of this duality in the context of ongoing ethnic conflict render the **legal system weak**. In most instances, appealed customary cases are reviewed *de novo* and no deference is given to the customary court, nor are the cases remanded when faced with an incomplete factual record.³¹ Although a large number of laws have been passed since 2005 (including for example the Penal Code Act 2008, the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 2008 and the Land Act 2009), their use in legal disputes and courts is limited. Poor dissemination of laws, little experience with the new statutory provisions, the difficulty of many legal staff in understanding English, and lack of access to statutory courts limit the relevance of the new laws.³²

South Sudan remains **highly militarized** following decades of conflict. At independence the South Sudan Army, largely comprised of ex-SPLM/A fighters from the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, was estimated to be 300,000.³³ A dispute between President Kiir and Vice President Machar erupted into armed conflict in December 2013, with rebel factions (largely Nuer) or the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), fighting government SPLA (largely Dinka) forces. According to the International Crisis Group however, the recent conflict is best understood by having a more nuanced view of the nature of ethnic conflict in South Sudan. Divisions between the "SPLM 7" Dinka in Jonglei and the Bah el Gazal Dinka remains a determining factor for some.³⁴ While many Nuer remain with the government with some rejecting ethnic politics and not considering Machar to be their leader, the position of the Nuer within the SPLA is "increasingly tenuous" following reports of mistreatment of loyalists. Defections of senior Nuer (and others) continue, with some leaving the country.

Since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013, Governors of various states, particularly Central, Eastern and Equatoria States, have been pressuring youth to join the Army or face retribution.³⁵ And "child soldiers", a feature of South Sudan's long struggle for independence, are again a feature of this conflict. It has been estimated that as many as 11,000 boys aged 12 – 17 have been forcibly recruited by both the SPLA and the rebels.³⁶ Roughly a year since the eruption of the conflict, splintering interests, weak command and control and proliferating militias and self-defence forces has ensured that low level fighting continues, with an upsurge being predicted for the upcoming dry season. In June 2014 more than 35% of the approved budget for 2014/15 was allocated to the military.³⁷ In July, the news agency Bloomberg reported an arms sale of \$38m from China, and claimed that the government had spent \$1bn

Paul Mertenskoetter and Dong Samuel Luak, "An Overview of the Legal System and Legal Research in the Republic of South Sudan," *GlobaLex*, November/December 2012, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Sudan.htm (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

³¹ Mertenskoetter and Luak, "An Overview of the Legal System and Legal Research in the Republic of South Sudan."

³² Mertenskoetter and Luak, "An Overview of the Legal System and Legal Research in the Republic of South Sudan."

³³ The World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan* (The International Finance Corporation, 2013), p.5.

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/02/07/000333037_20130207110223/Rendered/PDF/747670ISN0P1290OfficialUseOnly090.pdf (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

³⁴ "Some Jonglei Dinka resent being put in the middle and bearing the brunt of the revenge for what they consider a Bar el Gazal Dinka (Salva Kiir's home area) effort to maintain the Kiir presidency and their recourse to ethnic violence in Juba to do so."

The International Crisis Group, "South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name," *Africa Report* No.217 (2014), p.11,

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/south-sudan/217-south-sudan-a-civil-war-by-any-other-name.aspx> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

³⁵ Radio Tamuzj (2014) reported that the governor "has given his county commissioners two weeks to mobilize 6,000 recruits for the army, 1,500 per county. As quoted by Gurtong news, the governor warned those who would sabotage the ongoing SPLA recruitment: We are aware of your activities that you are playing against these mobilizations and we know what we can do to you, you will face the consequences if you are here in this state supporting the rebels"

Augustino Lucano, "A History of South Sudan Militarization," *South Sudan News Agency*, 18 March 2014,

<http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/columnists/a-history-of-south-sudan-militarization> (Accessed 04 April, 2014)

³⁶ According to UNICEF around 70% of an estimated 11,000 child soldiers are serving with rebel groups, including the notorious White Army, known for sending thousands of children into battle.

Tom Burridge, "Child Soldiers Still Being Recruited in South Sudan," *BBC News – Africa*, 26 October 2014,

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29762263> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

³⁷ Republic of South Sudan – Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, *Summary Table for the Approved Budget 2014-15*, (2014) <http://www.grss-mof.org/news/national-legislature-approves-government-budget-201415/> (Retrieved February 11, 2015)

on weapons since the start of the conflict.³⁸ Surrounding countries, in particular Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, have provided assistance to the factions,³⁹ adding a regional dimension to the conflict.

2.2.1 Corruption

Corruption is a serious constraint on effective governance and economic growth. A perception survey conducted by the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) in 2011 concluded that 96% of respondents felt that corruption was common, with 97% seeing it as a ‘serious’ or ‘very serious’ problem. This represents a slight increase compared with the survey from 2007.⁴⁰ A public opinion survey in Juba in 2012 found that 66% of those surveyed had contact with and bribed at least one of the nine main service providers.⁴¹ In June 2012, President Kiir sent a letter to 75 current and former oil officials asking them to return \$4bn worth of oil revenue which had been stolen.⁴² He promised that any officials that returned their stolen money would receive confidentiality and an amnesty from prosecution.

According to the US Department of State, the SSACC does not have sufficient prosecutorial power nor resources to pursue investigations and has only pursued 6 investigations since 2009.⁴³ With little political will, weak governance and judicial frameworks and systems, corruption will remain a significant barrier to sustained political maturation and economic growth.

2.2.2 Decentralization

There are four levels of government in South Sudan: central; state;⁴⁴ county; and payam (similar to a district). Land issues as well as familial disputes and sexual transgressions are dealt with by traditional or customary systems, with local government providing oversight to the traditional leaders.⁴⁵ The states have their own constitutions and independently elect their Governor and members of the state legislative assembly; however, the states rely on central government for their revenue while all subterranean natural resources belong to the central government.⁴⁶ Prior to December 2013, efforts were underway to support the capacity of lower levels of government to provide basic services⁴⁷ based on a 2009 Local

38 Ilya Gridneff, “China Sells South Sudan Arms as its Government Talks Peace,” *Bloomberg*, 09 July 2014, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/norinco-sells-south-sudan-arms-as-chinese-government-talks-peace.html> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

39 At the same time, state and opposition-supported, ethnically-based armed groups, such as the Nuer White Armies, have flourished and are only tenuously controlled by their sponsors. Including the Ugandan army and Sudanese rebels backing the government, there are now at least two dozen armed entities operating in South Sudan. The fragile coalitions threaten to further fracture, particularly in oil-producing Upper Nile State.

International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: Looming Military Offensives in South Sudan,” *All Africa.com*, 30 October 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201410301420.html> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

40 The report is no longer available on the SSACC website, but was cited in DFID’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for South Sudan https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213914/anti-corruption-strategy-ss.pdf, as well as African Economic Outlook’s 2014 Report on South Sudan:

http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/SoudanDuSUD_ENG.pdf

41 Police, Registry and Permit Services, Judiciary, Land Services, Customs, Tax Revenue, Utilities, Education System and Medical Services. *Transparency International*, “Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in East Africa,” 10 May 2012,

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/daily_lives_and_corruption_east_africa (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

42 “An estimated \$4-billion are unaccounted for or, simply put, stolen by current and former officials, as well as corrupt individuals with close ties to government officials,” President Salva Kiir said in a letter to his officials.

Geoffrey York, “South Sudan’s \$4-billion Query Answered: Oil Revenue Stolen by Corrupt Officials,” *The Globe and Mail*, 05 June 2012, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/south-sudans-4-billion-query-answered-oil-revenue-stolen-by-corrupt-officials/article4231805/> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

43 United States Department of State, “2013 Investment Climate Statement – South Sudan,” Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204855.htm> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

York, “South Sudan’s \$4-billion Query Answered: Oil Revenue Stolen by Corrupt Officials.”

44 Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Jongei, Unity, Lakes, Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap. The highest state-level executive authority is the Governor. State legislative assemblies pass legislation in accordance with and subject to the supremacy of national laws, in case of conflict.

45 IS Academy and Royal Tropical Institute, *Food Security and Land Governance Factsheet – South Sudan*, Prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011), <http://www.landgovernance.org/system/files/South%20Sudan%20Factsheet%20-%202012.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

46 Mertenskoetter and Luak, “An Overview of the Legal System and Legal Research in the Republic of South Sudan.”

47 See for example, the Local Governance and Service Delivery Project, financed by the World Bank, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, p.25.

Government Act. Many of the new local governance institutions lacked clear mandates, regulatory frameworks, necessary levels of funding and human capacity. Furthermore, communication channels between the central government and the states were not clear, limiting their effectiveness. The outbreak of the most recent conflict has ended efforts at putting in place legislation, financial and procurement management systems at the central, state and local government levels to respond to community-driven requests for local infrastructure. The state governments rely heavily on financial transfers from Juba, while the national government is heavily dependent on oil revenue; governments are reported to “hold fast” to their funds rather than allocating them to urgent development priorities.⁴⁸

2.2.3 Institutional Capacity

As noted by the World Bank (2013)⁴⁹, despite functioning as an autonomous entity since 2005, the capacity of the GRSS to support economic growth, develop infrastructure, provide security, and **deliver services** such as health and education, is **very limited**. The lack of government capacity extends to a weak public financial management system.⁵⁰ Until the eruption of the conflict, donors provided considerable funding to build infrastructure, as well as government institutions and capacity to deliver services, in the country.⁵¹

2.2.4 Capacity of Civil Society

A draft of a Non-Governmental Organisation Bill (NGO 2013, formerly called the Voluntary and Humanitarian Nongovernmental Organizations Bill), has been developed and discussed in a public hearing on 29 November 2013 but its fate is uncertain given the recent political and ethnic violence in the country. There are more than 200 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in South Sudan, many of which are members of the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance.⁵² CSOs are engaged in a wide range of activities across 22 sectors, from health, education, food security, gender equality, and peace building to youth, sports, and Internally Displaced Person/returnee issues. Most of the CSOs in South Sudan were formed prior to independence in response to the humanitarian crisis during the decades of conflict. Focusing on service delivery, and substituting for government, limited both the connection between the people and their government and the capacity of government to respond to the needs of the population in a transparent and accountable way. Urban bias and politicisation also hinder the credibility and capacity of civil society organizations,⁵³ while recent attacks, including threats of expulsion, from the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission has sobered those INGOs involved in addressing the growing humanitarian crisis in the country.⁵⁴ And, as noted in the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), civil society remains underdeveloped.⁵⁵

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported a Decentralization Roundtable in June 2012 which involved all 10 State Governors and the tabling of a number of resolutions including the need to adjust the constitution and the establishment of a Ministry mandated to look after local government and decentralisation.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *South Sudan Annual Report 2012* (2012), p.19, <http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Reports/UNDP-SS-Annual-Report-2012-Web.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁴⁸ *The Guardian*, “South Sudan: New country, same old mistakes?” 05 March 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/05/south-sudan-independence-poisonous-thorn-hearts> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁴⁹ The World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, pgs.9-10.

⁵⁰ The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA), *Republic of South Sudan: PFM Professionalisation Readiness Assessment*, February 2012, <http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Report-CIPFA.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁵¹ Maxwell and Santschi, *From Post-Conflict Recovery and State Building to a Renewed Humanitarian Emergency: A Brief Reflection on South Sudan*, p.2.

⁵² South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, “Overview of South Sudan Civil Society Alliance,” 14 February 2014, <http://sscsa.info/?p=1> (February 12, 2015)

⁵³ Rift Valley Institute, “Conference of South Sudan Civil Society Organizations,” January 10 2014, <http://riftvalley.net/event/south-sudan-peace-possible#.U30KfpJxTTo>, (Retrieved January 23, 2015)

⁵⁴ The tabling of an Oxfam report entitled *From Crisis to Catastrophe | Oxfam International, October 2014*. This paper was endorsed by some 30 well known INGOs (see final page of the above attachment). The Country Director of OXFAM was summoned by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission to “explain themselves.” The RRC is the arm of the government, loosely allied with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, responsible for oversight of the delivery of all humanitarian assistance in South Sudan; it is the direct descendant of a similar organisation that existed through the life of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the wartime humanitarian operation overseen by UNICEF, in collaboration with both the SPLM/A and the Khartoum administration in the war years. coupled with threats of expulsion.

⁵⁵ See Canada's draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016) ([SGDE-EDRMS-#7029487-SOUTH SUDAN INTERIM CDS 2014-2016 - DRAFT](#))

2.3 Economic Context

South Sudan was classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC) in December 2012.⁵⁶ Since independence the economy contracted by 21% in 2011-12 and 28% in 2012-13, largely owing to the dispute with Sudan over oil transit fees,⁵⁷ and a 40% reduction in government spending.⁵⁸



The outbreak of the conflict in December 2013 has only worsened the prospects for economic growth. According to the African Development Bank, in the medium term, provided the civil war is resolved with order and security restored, South Sudan has the potential to grow its GDP by as much as 7-8% per year.⁵⁹ However, the absence (or extremely poor state) of physical infrastructure, such as roads and transport, poses challenges to economic growth going forward.⁶⁰

South Sudan has a two-tier economy: one that is oil-based and accounts for 70% of government revenues and 60% of GDP (exports and associated investments); and one that is “non-oil” which includes (largely subsistence) agriculture, construction and services.⁶¹ According to BP’s 2013 Statistical Review, a majority of the oil reserves are in the oil-rich Muglad and Melut basins, with 1.5 bn barrels in Sudan and 3.5bn barrels in South Sudan, along with 3 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves.⁶² In May of 2014, South Sudan’s output was 165,000 barrels per day (bpd), down from 245,000 bpd in December 2013 when the fighting broke out,⁶³ and a peak of 486,000 bpd in 2010. As a recognition that both countries need the oil revenues, and possibly a signal of a de-escalation of tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, the Government of the Republic of Sudan has recently agreed to provide materials, engineers and electricity to South Sudan to repair the oilfields and increase production, ending the 14 month shutdown that devastated both countries.⁶⁴

South Sudan relies on a pipeline that runs through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea to export its oil, but is exploring options for additional pipelines (through Ethiopia or Kenya, see Figure 1⁶⁵), while at the same time increasing the number of refineries.⁶⁶ Foreign investors from Asia and Europe dominate oil

⁵⁶ UN Office of the High Representative of the Least Developed Countries, “South Sudan Joins LDC Category,” 2014, <http://unohrrls.org/news/south-sudan-joins-ldc-category/> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁵⁷ Following South Sudan’s secession, Sudan requested transit fees of \$32-36/barrel (bbl) in an attempt to make up for the oil revenue loss, while South Sudan offered a transit fee of less than \$1/bbl. Tensions escalated at the end of 2011 when Sudan began to confiscate a portion of South Sudan’s oil as a payment for unpaid transit fees, and shortly after, South Sudan shut down production. After nearly 15 months of intermittent negotiations, South Sudan restarted oil production in April 2013. Despite the progress that has been made to reconcile differences, several unresolved issues remain and production may be curtailed again in the future. US Energy Information Administration, “Sudan and South Sudan,” 03 September 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SU> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁵⁸ African Development Bank Group, “South Sudan Economic Outlook,” 2014, <http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-economic-outlook/> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁵⁹ African Development Bank Group, “South Sudan Economic Outlook.”

⁶⁰ International Fund for Agricultural Development, *Enabling Poor Rural People to Overcome Poverty in South Sudan*, (Addis Ababa: IFAD, 2014), p.2, http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/regions/pf/factsheets/south_sudan.pdf (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

United States Department of State, “2013 Investment Climate Statement – South Sudan,” February 2013, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204855.htm> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁶¹ Yousif et al, “Sudan.”

⁶² Sudan/South Sudan ranked 25th in the global list of countries with proven oil reserves, with South Sudan at 3.5bn in proven reserves, about a tenth of Nigeria (37.5bn) and similar to Indonesia (3.89bn). In reference to the main investors in South Sudan’s petroleum sector, China has 20.35bn barrels, Malaysia has 4bn barrels, India has 5.61 bn barrels, France has 0.09bn barrels and Kuwait has 104 bn barrels. US Energy Information Administration, “Countries,” 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=reserves> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

US Energy Information Administration, “Sudan and South Sudan,” 03 September 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SU> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁶³ Drazen Jorgic, “South Sudan Says Khartoum to Help Repair Damaged Oilfields,” *The Star Online*, 25 May 2014, <http://www.thestar.com.my/News/World/2014/05/25/South-Sudan-says-Khartoum-to-help-repair-damaged-oilfields/> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)


⁶⁴ Jorgic, “South Sudan Says Khartoum to Help Repair Damaged Oilfields.”

⁶⁵ US Energy Information Administration, “Sudan and South Sudan.”

⁶⁶ South Sudan’s Ministry of Petroleum and Mining signed agreements for the construction of two refineries by Russian and American companies. United States Department of State, “2013 Investment Climate Statement – South Sudan.”

production.⁶⁷ The Petroleum Act of 2012⁶⁸ established a governance structure that includes a National Petroleum and Gas Commission (that provides policy direction), the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining (that manages and develops the petroleum sector) and (to participate in the upstream, midstream and downstream activities of the petroleum and gas sector), the National Petroleum and Gas Corporation which was meant to replace NILEPET,⁶⁹ though it was unclear how far this transition has been implemented.⁷⁰ The Petroleum Revenue Management Bill (PRMB) 2012, awaiting the signature of the President, aims to put in place a more credible and transparent management of the oil revenues at the national, state and local levels.⁷¹

While concerns continue to be raised about the effectiveness of these specialised but nascent institutions as well as their governance, there are promising signs for the sector overall in view of the recent agreement between Sudan and South Sudan to cooperate and resume the production and transit of oil from the two oilfields in northern Unity State bordering Sudan.⁷² Weak institutions, along with corruption (see above) have contributed to the ***mis-management of South Sudan's natural resources***. The Governments of Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia are particularly interested in benefiting from the new pipelines and have therefore significant vested economic interests in South Sudan's oil reserves.



South Sudan also has promising mineral deposits of gold, uranium, copper, manganese, marble, rare earth and gemstones (including diamonds), most of which are untapped. The Mining Act of 2012 includes a licensing system based on international standards, including the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.⁷³ Little is available on the internet regarding the capacity of the Ministry of Mining, but USAID may well be involved as they financed the development of an information sheet for the Ministry.

A thriving agricultural sector is critical for economic growth as well as food security. More than 78% of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture and pastoralism (see Figure 2⁷⁴), although both account for less than 15% of GDP.⁷⁵ South Sudan has the highest livestock per capita ratio in Africa (with an average of 25 livestock per household), owing in part to its low human population. However, frequent droughts, cattle disease and other environmental factors put the health of livestock at risk (further detailed below).⁷⁶ Armed cattle raids, related to the proliferation of small arms

⁶⁷ Investors from Asia include: the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), PETRONAS from Malaysia, and Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) from India. Total, from France and Kufpec from Kuwait have an exploration and production agreement in Jonglei as well as parts of other states, but have yet to start operations.

⁶⁸ Government of South Sudan, *The Petroleum Act, 2012*, (2012), <http://www.mpmisouthsudan.org/docs/Petroleum%20Act,%202012%20-%20Signed%20-%20July%206.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁶⁹ South Sudan's national oil company and the technical, operational and commercial arm of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining established in 2003. Gulf Oil and Gas, "Nilepet Petroleum and Gas Corporation," <http://www.gulfoilandgas.com/webprod1/SupplierCat.asp?sid=10064> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷⁰ South Sudan Civics Info, "Nilepet (Nile Petroleum Corporation) and the National Petroleum and Gas Corporation," 21 August 2013, <http://www.southsudancivics.info/SSCinfo/article/nilepet-nile-petroleum-corporation-and-national-petroleum-and-gas-corporation> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷¹ Aside from insulating public expenditure from the inherent volatility of oil revenue, the bill includes the establishment of stabilization and future generation funds, provisions that prevent corruption and mismanagement by demanding publication of contracts, ensuring the regular release of production and revenue data, and requiring that all agreements be awarded through a competitive process. The PRMS also include important provisions on how revenues are to be collected, managed, audited, reported and transferred from the central government to the state and community level. African Development Bank Group, "South Sudan Economic Outlook."

⁷² The two operators in these two fields are the Sudd Petroleum Operating Company and Greater Pioneer Operating Company.

⁷³ South Sudan Investment Authority, *South Sudan: Mining and Minerals Sector*, Undersecretary of Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment, <http://www.southsudanembassydc.org/PDFs/Invesment/South%20Sudan%20Mining%20Brochure.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷⁴ African Development Bank Group, *Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Economic Growth*, (Tunis-Belvedere, 2013), p.132, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/South%20Sudan%20Infrastructure%20Action%20Plan%20-%2020A%20Program%20for%20Sustained%20Strong%20Economic%20Growth%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷⁵ The World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, p.6.

⁷⁶ International Organisation for Migration, *South Sudan Village Assessment Survey Report* (Juba, 2013) p.31, p.83, <http://southsudan.iom.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/IOM-Village-Assessment-Survey-Report-2013.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

during the protracted civil war, also threaten household livelihoods. Although cattle raiding has historically taken place in the country, “the rate and level of cattle raiding, as well as the degree of violence that firearms permit, has helped to accelerate and intensify a practice that previous to the civil war was undertaken at lower levels of frequency and violence.”⁷⁷

Only 4% of South Sudan is under cultivation, despite having abundant arable land. The main cereal crops, which account for more than 80% of cultivation, are sorghum, maize, millet and rice, with sorghum being the main staple in most states. Other crops include sweet potatoes, yams, and papayas which are grown for home consumption and sale in local markets. South Sudan imports a significant portion of food from Uganda and Kenya, largely for urban consumption.⁷⁸ In terms of cash crops, coffee is grown commercially and, there are a handful of tobacco farmers. Fruit trees include banana, plantain, pineapple, mangoes and citrus. The “Green Belt Zone”⁷⁹ has the most potential for sustained crop production. The crops include cassava, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, maize, finger millet, cow peas, beans, pigeon peas, vegetables (onions, okra, tomatoes, cabbage, eggplant, cucumber and pumpkins). There is significant potential for producing and exporting high value fruits and vegetables, such as pineapples, onions, tomatoes and yams.

Levels of production remain low owing to the conflict, erratic or delayed rains, a lack of availability of and access to quality seeds and inadequate agricultural infrastructure (water reservoirs, irrigation systems and access roads). 70% of pastoral households and 2 million animals are threatened with endemic diseases (haemorrhagic septicaemia, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, anthrax and peste des petits ruminants), with limited local and national capacity to monitor, control and respond to these diseases.⁸⁰ Institutions, organizations and individuals involved in the sector suffer from organizational inertia and weak implementation and coordination capacity at the national and state levels; according to the African Development Bank, GRSS agricultural institutions need to be “rebuilt from scratch.”⁸¹

Though a “fragile state,” statebuilding is seen as essential for promoting economic growth,⁸² making the role Ministry of Finance/Commerce and Economic Planning (MoFEP) critical in terms of: setting national priorities; obtaining and coordinating internal and external financial resources; and ensuring that government spending is targeted, relevant, appropriate and effective.

The South Sudan Development Plan 2011 – 2013, led by MoFEP and developed collaboratively with central ministries, state and county level officials as well as the donor community, identifies the core development priorities,⁸³ while MoFEP and the UN prioritized the six core governance functions essential to the sustainability of government (along with an action plan), that forms the basis for donor

Food and Agricultural Organisation, “Enhance Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas: South Sudan,”

<http://foodsecuritycluster.net/sites/default/files/Pastoral%20livelihood%20presentation%20UNCT%20Juba.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷⁷ Matthew B. Arnold and Chris Alden, “This Gun is Our Food: Demilitarising the White Army Militias of South Sudan,” *Security in Practice*, no. 722 (2007), p.16, <http://english.nupi.no/content/download/1814/41974/version/10/file/wp-722-Arnold-Alden.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷⁸ United States Agency for International Development, “Two Sudans: The Separation of Africa’s Largest Country and the Road Ahead,” *Frontlines*, September/October 2011, p.17, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/frontlines/FL_SEP_OCT_2011.pdf (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁷⁹ The “Green Belt Zone” which has rich fertile soil and receives two rains per year is comprised of the three Equatoria States: Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria.

⁸⁰ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “South Sudan,” 2014, <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/countries/detail/en/c/147627/> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁸¹ African Development Bank Group, *Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Economic Growth* (Tunis-Belvedere, 2013), p.164, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/South%20Sudan%20Infrastructure%20Action%20Plan%20-%2020A%20Program%20for%20Sustained%20Strong%20Economic%20Growth%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁸² OECD, *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t We Do Better?* (OECD, 2011),

<http://www.oecd.org/development/incdf/48697077.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁸³ Government of the Republic of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013: Realising Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for All* (Juba, 2011), <http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/South-Sudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

engagement.⁸⁴ These functions included: Executive Leadership; Security Sector; Rule of Law / Law Enforcement; Fiduciary Management; Public Administration; and Natural Resources.

Work is underway to reform the tax system in order to diversify revenue sources and increase the efficiency of collection. The Taxation Amendment Act of 2012 included additional taxes⁸⁵ as well as a system to better collect and track revenues.⁸⁶ Despite the political, security and economic context, including specific fiscal challenges,⁸⁷ as well as limited institutional capacity,⁸⁸ according to the African Development Bank, the MoFEP has “implemented a responsible fiscal policy,”⁸⁹ reining in expenditures when revenues do not keep pace. While the budgets continue to focus on social service delivery in rural areas, the rapid development of infrastructure to support economic development and job creation in the agricultural and non-oil sectors of the economy,⁹⁰ revenue volatility has compromised the ability of Government to effectively deliver on its budget priorities and has created a significant and growing financing gap that will need to be met through the continuation of austerity measures along with new (non-concessional) borrowing.⁹¹ Budget analysis reveals a number of fundamental challenges that need to be addressed, including rising debt crowding out private investment, the appropriate balance between capital and recurrent costs,⁹² and poor budget execution.⁹³ Improved public financial management at the national and state levels remains a priority for effective economic governance.

Owing to capacity challenges within the Central Bank as well as the underdeveloped financial sector, monetary policy has not been effective in reigning in inflation, with inflation rates reaching 80% in 2012, depreciating the South Sudan Pound (SSP) while the costs of imported goods increased. Fiscal austerity has assisted in reducing the inflation rate to 7.2% between September 2012 and September 2013, but the ongoing conflict along with supply constraints and hoarding may well push the inflation rate higher than the 11% target for 2014.⁹⁴ The Central Bank continues to maintain a peg to the US dollar, which with the decline in foreign exchange reserves, has resulted in a large parallel currency market (as well as further consumer price inflation and depreciation of the currency) because the GRSS cannot

⁸⁴ UNDP, “GoSS Lays Out Its Priority Core Governance Functions at High-Level Meeting,” *UNDP Southern Sudan Update 2*, 8 (2010), <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Documents/Media%20&%20Publications/UNDP-SS-%20UPDATE%20September%202010%20-%20core%20state%20functions%20-%20for%20web.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁸⁵ This included a sales tax on imports, increased excise tax rate on alcohol, tobacco and vehicles, an advance payment system of income tax at the time of importing goods into the country. A centralized tax collection agreement with the states permits goods and services to move throughout the country. A state excise tax was included in order to improve the capacity of the state to manage their own development agenda.

⁸⁶ Based on a pilot program enabling taxpayers and importers to deposit their tax and customs payments directly to commercial banks coupled with the creation of a single treasury account for collections from all revenue-generating government agencies.

⁸⁷ GRSS faces specific fiscal challenges owing to the structure of its economy, including volatile and unpredictable revenue inflows from oil, almost total dependence on oil revenues and an increased in fixed costs as a share of the budget owing to the shutdown of the oil pipeline. In the first year following the referendum, an inability to control government expenditure led to strong inflation in 2011/12; tight fiscal policy for 2012/13 and 2013/14 has kept government expenditures under control until oil revenues stabilized, which has been difficult owing in light of the conflict between Kiir and Machar which has interfered with production in the oil producing states.

⁸⁸ According to the World Bank. “South Sudan has limited...public financial management, economic policymaking and state-society contract at the time of the CPA and the situation has improved only marginally since.” The World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, p.10.

⁸⁹ African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012 – 2014*, (2012), p.4-5, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2012-2014%20-%20South%20Sudan%20-%20Interim%20Country%20Strategy%20Paper.pdf> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁹⁰ See the 2013/14 budget in - Aggrey Tisa Sabuni, “Finance Minister Sabuni Makes Budget Case to South Sudan Parliament,” *The New Sudan Vision*, 20 September 2013, <http://www.newsudanvision.com/sudan-news-stories-publisher/2749-aggrey-tisa-sabuni> (Retrieved February 12, 2015)

⁹¹ Although the legal framework for borrowing is clearly defined in the constitution, but the required oversight, policy and monitoring structure (including a debt management strategy) are not in place. The GRSS has accumulated debt stock amounting to UDS 1.25 billion, which will be increased in 2013/14 with additional concessional borrowing to finance selected infrastructure projects.

⁹² 58% of the budget is allocated to operating, costs and salaries compared to only 15% for investment, limiting government's ability to address the infrastructure gap.

African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012 – 2014*, p.4-5.

Additionally, as noted by the World Bank, the large salary outlays in a country with major supply-side constraints has fed the demand for imported food and other goods.

World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, p.7.

⁹³ “Budget execution is very low and the government has not put forward measures for enhancing the efficiency of execution of the budget. Hence it is unclear whether the public funds can be efficiently absorbed.”

African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012 – 2014*, p4.

⁹⁴ The monthly inflation rate in April 2014 was 18.79%, while food inflation was 19.91%.

Trading Economics, “South Sudan – Economic Indicators”, 2014, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/indicators> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012 – 2014*, p.5-6.

provide a sufficient amount of foreign exchange at the official rate. The resulting budget and balance of payments deficits have been financed by drawing down foreign exchange reserves even further⁹⁵ while increasing overall debt.⁹⁶

A key government institution essential for effective and transparent economic management is the National Audit Chamber, the Supreme Audit Institution for the GRSS. Established according to the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the Audit Chamber Provisional Order was signed into law by the President in 2011. It is unclear whether the law has been enacted by Parliament, given that a considerable amount of legislation has arguably been delayed due to the current conflict.⁹⁷ In addition, the South Sudan National Audit Chamber Act (June 2012) is still in draft. Few reports have been produced owing to the lack of a legal framework that would give the office sufficient financial and operational independence, as well as limited institutional capacity.⁹⁸

Most analysts agree that poor infrastructure, a lack of skilled and unskilled labour, complex administrative processes, a legal system that is ineffective, underfunded, overburdened and subject to executive interference, lack of clarity among national, state and county jurisdictions over business licensing, taxes and customs, limited access to credit, and the lack of a collateral registry, are serious impediments to trade and private sector investment.⁹⁹ The International Finance Corporation (IFC) Doing Business in Juba 2011 ranked Juba at 159th out of 183 economies on the ease of doing business (see Figure 3¹⁰⁰). Despite this, there is an active private sector, largely in the banking sector, real estate, ICT and agriculture that were not captured in the *Doing Business 2011* report. For example, the number of companies registered increased from 470 to 12,000 since 2011.¹⁰¹ Given the limited resources from the GRSS and donors, the role of the private sector is crucial, particularly in the provision of infrastructure. Strengthening the framework for business development, including through public-private partnerships in the ICT and transport sectors is quite urgent according to the African Development Bank.

Overall, decades of conflict have taken their toll on the economic infrastructure, while, as mentioned above, implicated government institutions directly supportive of economic growth are nascent. Development throughout the country remains limited due to inadequate public services, weak private sector investment, ongoing corruption, and degraded and mismanaged natural resources. The World Bank's Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) has ranked South Sudan at 2.1, which is low, relative to the SSA average of 3.2.¹⁰²

Figure 3: Doing Business Indicators (days)

Indicator	Juba South Sudan (days)	Khartoum Sudan (days)	Sub Saharan Africa (days)
Starting a business	123	121	126
Dealing with construction permits	49	139	117
Registering property	124	40	121
Getting credit	176	138	120
Protecting investors	173	154	113
Paying taxes	84	94	116
Trading across borders	181	143	136
Enforcing contracts	74	146	118
Closing a business	183	183	128
Overall ease of doing business	159	154	137

⁹⁵ As at June 2013, the reserves had declined to 1.5 months of imports (generally countries need sufficient reserves for 3 months of imports). African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012 – 2014*, p.5-6.

⁹⁶ General Government Gross Debt as a percent of GDP has increased from 0 in 2011 to 16.074 in 2014. International Monetary Fund, "Report for Selected Countries and Subjects", *World Economic Outlook Database*, last modified April 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2011&ey=2014&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=23&pr1.y=13&c=733&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDP_D%2CNGDPRPC%2CNGDPDPC%2CNID_NGDP%2CPCPIEPCH%2CGGX_NGDP%2CGGX_CNL_NGDP%2CGGXVDN_NGDP%2CGGXWDG_NGDP%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a= (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

⁹⁷ National Audit Chamber– Republic of South Sudan, "Functions", last modified in 2013, <http://www.audit-chamber-ss.org/functions.html> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

⁹⁸ The 2011 – 2015 strategic plan for the NAC has identified a number of priorities including increasing its professional staff complement from 15 in 2010 to 130 by 2013 and constructing an office.

National Audit Chamber – Republic of South Sudan, "Functions."

⁹⁹ World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, p.6.

See also, US Department of State, "2013 Investment Climate Statement - South Sudan", last modified in February 2013, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204855.htm> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹⁰⁰ World Bank and International Finance Corporation, *Doing Business in Juba 2011*, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), p.64, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Subnational-Reports/DB11-Sub-Juba.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹⁰¹ African Development Bank Group, *South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012 – 2014*, p.6-7.

¹⁰² World Bank, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2013: South Sudan, last modified in 2013, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/country/south-sudan> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

2.4 Social and Human Development Context

Independence has not addressed the structural determinants of poverty in South Sudan. Poverty is widespread while access to essential services remains limited. Most development that has taken place since independence has a significant urban bias, with the majority of the population seeing little benefit arising from independence¹⁰³ worsened by the conflict that erupted in December 2013. Based on the most recent data, more than half of the population lives below the poverty line¹⁰⁴ with most of the poor living in the rural areas.¹⁰⁵ The poorest states are Northern Bar el Ghazal, Unity and Warrap.¹⁰⁶

Although food accounts for more than 79% of average household expenditures, 47% of the population is undernourished.¹⁰⁷ One third of South Sudanese are now food insecure, with food security deteriorating at an alarming rate since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013. According to the FAO, 3.5 million people are now facing crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity and the risk of famine must now be taken into consideration.¹⁰⁸ The conflict in December resulted in more than a million people displaced, including 310,000 people in neighboring countries.

The 2014 budget recently passed by the Council of Ministers projected spending for 5% and 4 % of GDP on education and health respectively¹⁰⁹ and is judged by an Article IV mission by the IMF to have struck the “right balance” between spending on priority areas and economic stability.¹¹⁰ Access to essential services remains a challenge: only 55% of the population has access to improved sources of drinking water,¹¹¹ 44% live within a 5km radius of a health care facility unit (one of the lowest in the world)¹¹² and only 37% of the population above the age of 6 has ever attended school.¹¹³ As indicated in Figure 4 above,¹¹⁴ the key social indicators for South Sudan demonstrate that, for the most part, the people in South Sudan are more poor and have limited access to essential services, relative to other Sub Saharan African countries. South Sudan is still unranked by the UN Human Development Index. However, the

Indicator	S.Sudan	SSA
Gross National Income per capita, \$	1,050	746
Poverty Headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population/rural population)	51/55	n/a
Life expectancy at birth, years (total/female)	55/56	47/58
Adult literacy rate % 15 yrs and above (total/female)	27/16	60/53
Net primary enrolment ratio, %	48	66
Ratio of girls to boys primary school, %	59	86
Under-five-mortality-rate, per 1,000	135	163
Infant mortality rate, per 1000	102	96
Underweight children under 5, %	34	30
Maternal mortality rate, per 100,000 live births	2,054	921
Population with access to improved water, %	27	26

¹⁰³ *The Guardian*, “South Sudan: New country, same old mistakes?” 05 March 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/05/south-sudan-independence-poisonous-thorn-hearts> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹⁰⁴ A survey undertaken by the Government of South Sudan found 50.5% of the population living below the national poverty line (which was defined as a level of consumption less than SDG 73/month - \$31.60/month or just over \$1/day).

African Development Bank Group, *Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Economic Growth* (Tunis-Belvedere, 2013), p.26, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/South%20Sudan%20Infrastructure%20Action%20Plan%20-%2020A%20Program%20for%20Sustained%20Strong%20Economic%20Growth%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf> (Accessed February 18, 2015)

¹⁰⁵ The incidence of poverty in the rural areas is 55% while it is only 24% in the urban areas owing to the presence of “relatively well paid” government officials and those working for international aid organizations. African Development Bank Group, *Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Economic Growth*, p.26.

¹⁰⁶ 76% of the population in Northern Bar el Ghazal, 68% in Unity and 64% in Warrap live below the poverty line.

African Development Bank Group, *Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Economic Growth*, p.26.

¹⁰⁷ African Development Bank Group, *Infrastructure Action Plan in South Sudan: A Program for Sustained Economic Growth*, p.26.

¹⁰⁸ Figures are based on the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis carried out in May 2014.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “FAO in Emergencies: South Sudan”, last modified in 2014, <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/countries/detail/en/c/147627/> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹⁰⁹ Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning – Government of South Sudan, *Budget at a Glance: Budget 2014/15* (2014), p. 1, <http://www.grss-mof.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Budget-at-a-Glance-1415-v1.9.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹¹⁰ International Monetary Fund, “Republic of South Sudan: Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Mission on the 2013 Article IV Consultation and on Possible Support under the Rapid Credit Facility and a Staff-Monitored Program, International Monetary Fund”, last modified 25 September 2013, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13358.htm> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹¹¹ 67% of the urban population has access improved sources of drinking water compared to 53% of the rural population.

Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE), *Key Indicators for Southern Sudan* (Juba: SSCSE, 2011), p. 7., http://ssnbs.org/storage/key-indicators-for-southern-sudan/Key%20Indicators_A5_final.pdf (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹¹² World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, p.10.

¹¹³ Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, *Key Indicators for Southern Sudan*, p. 9.

¹¹⁴ Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, *Key Indicators for Southern Sudan*.

See also World Bank, World Databank: World Development Indicators, last modified in 2015, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

UNDP has confirmed that most of the MDGs will not be met in South Sudan, largely owing to the “massive level of poverty and deplorable human development situation” that is further aggravated by the “current state of conflict and fragility.”¹¹⁵

2.5 Human Rights, Conflict and Fragility

The GRSS has yet to ratify any major human rights treaties. According to Human Rights Watch, lack of capacity and inadequate training of police, prosecutors, and judges have resulted in numerous human rights violations in law enforcement and administering justice. Security forces have committed abuses while carrying out disarmament operations.¹¹⁶ Particularly since December 2013, abuses of human rights (in particular gender based human rights violations), including rape, murder and ethnic cleansing have been widely documented.¹¹⁷ The UN Human Rights Council has recently condemned the abuses, observing the “conflict spread quickly with extraordinary cruelty.”¹¹⁸

Humanitarian actors are increasingly having difficulty safely responding to the crisis. According to a report authored by 35 agencies working in South Sudan, between June and August, there were almost 180 occasions where they had not been able to access people in need; most of these incidents were due to violence against personnel and assets.¹¹⁹

The *GRSS has largely ceased to govern*, with efforts underway by the African Union’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to mediate between the two factions while the United Nations has adjusted the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISS) from peacebuilding to protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, monitoring and reporting on human rights, preventing further inter-communal violence and supporting the IGAD process as and when requested, and within available capabilities.¹²⁰ The conflict also has a regional dimension: while Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan are supportive the IGAD-led mediation process, Uganda continues to provide direct military support, including forces associated with Ugandan-supported Sudanese armed groups; “pipeline politics” is also evident.¹²¹ Furthermore, a long civil war that weakens South Sudan would allow the Government of Sudan to re-assert its influence over its southern neighbour in the short to medium term.¹²²

¹¹⁵ United Nations Development Programme, “The Millennium Development Goals in South Sudan”, last modified in 2012, http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/mdgoverview/overview.html (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights in South Sudan,” last modified in 2014, <http://www.hrw.org/africa/south-sudan> (Retrieved March 6, 2015)

¹¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, (UN, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/158 (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_821.pdf

See also International Crisis Group, “Crisis Watch Database”, last modified in 2015, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7B8B313EA2-534B-4421-B78C-776E93632115%7D#results> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

See also Louis Charbonneau, “South Sudan Sexual Violence ‘Rampant’, Two-Year-Old Raped: U.N.,” *Reuters*, 20 October 2014.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/20/us-southsudan-un-idUSKCN0192C320141020> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹¹⁸ “The abuses began with widespread and systematic attacks against and killings of Nuer in the capital Juba, ethnically profiled, pulled from cars, ordered out of their homes in house-to-house searches, shot and killed, rounded up, unlawfully detained, in some cases tortured by government security forces... Opposition forces in the first half of January shot and killed civilians they found in the town of Bor, Jonglei state, leaving a town dotted with rotting corpses. In Bentiu, Bor and Malakal in Upper Nile state, both sides have conducted massive looting of civilian property and have burned markets, neighborhoods and countless homes.”

Human Rights Watch, “UN Human Rights Council: Council has to Condemn Abuses in South Sudan,” last modified 25 June 2014,

<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/25/un-human-rights-council-council-has-condemn-abuses-south-sudan> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹¹⁹ Altogether, humanitarian agencies face countless obstacles including looting, illegal taxation of aid, and the killing and harassment of aid workers, as well as bureaucratic, practical, and security impediments to road, river and air travel.

Oxfam International, “From Crisis to Catastrophe: South Sudan’s Man-Made Crisis - And how the World Must Act Now To Prevent Catastrophe In 2015,” last modified 06 October 2014, <http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/crisis-catastrophe> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²⁰ United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, “UNMISS Mandate,” last modified in 2014,

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/mandate.shtml> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

See also United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, *Press Conference – Tuesday, 7 October 2014*, (UN, 2014),

<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/14-10-SRSG%20Loei%20Nr%20Verbatim%20Transcript-press%20conference.pdf>

(Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²¹ Kenya has a vested interest in ensuring that the Lamu Port Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET), one of Africa’s targets planned infrastructure projects, continues, with both Kenya and Uganda (sitting atop new oil finds themselves) benefitting from transit fees from South Sudan’s Block “B”. Discussions on constructing refineries continue in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. Private sector companies, such as Total and Exxon Mobile are also heavily implicated.

The main drivers of conflict in South Sudan include: a weak state; an unaccountable security sector; imprecise land ownership; rents from the natural resource sector; and differing agendas from surrounding states in the region. Most, with the exception of the regional dimension which is dynamic, are structural. The most recent International Crisis Group analysis of South Sudan suggests that as a result of the conflict in December 2013 more than 1,000,000 people have been displaced, as many as 10,000 people have been killed, more than 96,000 internally displaced people are sheltering inside UNMISS bases (with 47,000 alone in the flood-prone bog of Bentiu) and 5.9 million people (more than half the population) will need assistance since the outbreak of the conflict in December.¹²³ UN OCHA has estimated that nearly 2.2 million people in South Sudan are facing critical or emergency phases of food insecurity.¹²⁴ A recent report by the UN suggests that the number of displaced people has increased to 170,000 in the SPLM-North areas during the period January – July 2014.¹²⁵ And it has been predicted that more than 50,000 people will die from disease and malnutrition in 2014, as farmers have been unable to plant their crops.¹²⁶

As has been demonstrated in previous sections, South Sudan's fragility has political (including security), economic and social dimensions. According to the g7+ fragility spectrum, South Sudan is in crisis for each of the five key dimensions, namely inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenue generation.¹²⁷ Complementary peace and state-building, which includes inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources and accountable, fair service delivery, needs to be central to the design and delivery of programming by all partners targeting the most vulnerable, particularly women and children.

2.6 Gender Analysis

Gender inequality is prevalent across social, economic and political sectors in South Sudan. Little large-scale, reliable data is available on gender equality indicators due to ongoing conflict, as well as the limited amount of sex disaggregated data and statistical information more generally.¹²⁸ As mentioned, South Sudan was not included in the UNDP's most recent Human Development Report (and associated gender inequality index) due to data constraints.¹²⁹ However, smaller-scale statistics provide a partial

International Crisis Group, "South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name," *Africa Report* no. 217, (2014), p. 19.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/south-sudan/217-south-sudan-a-civil-war-by-any-other-name.aspx> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²² Mesfin Berouk, "The Crisis in South Sudan: A Game of Regional Chess," *Institute for Security Studies*, last modified 26 May 2014, <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-crisis-in-south-sudan-a-game-of-regional-chess> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²³ International Crisis Group, "South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name," p.14.

¹²⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. "JUBA2014 - 060: South Sudan; New SRSG Makes Her Public Debut." Embassy of Canada; Juba. Mission Report. (EDRMS 7168971).

¹²⁵ United Nations News Centre, "UN Relief Chief Warns of Looming Disaster Amid Linked Crises in Sudan and South Sudan," 16 July 2014, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48285#U8gk6JJxR8E> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²⁶ "The only reason famine is coming to South Sudan is because of the fighting, and the destruction, displacement and disruption of markets it has wrought. And yet the political leaders on both sides show little serious interest in ending the conflict and lessening the suffering of the people they pretend to lead and ought to serve."

Tristan McConnell, "South Sudan: The Hunger Caused by Bickering Politicians," *BBC News Africa*, July 3 2014,

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28143584> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²⁷ The dimensions include: **Inclusive Politics** (political settlement; political processes and institutions; societal relationships); **Security** (security condition; capacity of security institutions; size and proportionality of the security sector; resources and capacity of security sector institutions; performance of security institutions); **Justice** (justice conditions; capacity of justice institutions; performance of justice institutions); **Economic Foundations** (economic conditions; employment, livelihoods and development of private sectors); **Revenue and Services** (revenue generation; public administration; service delivery).

g7+, *Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum Launched in Kinshasa Democratic Republic of Congo: Preliminary Release*, Annex 1, (2013),

<http://static.squarespace.com/static/5212dafbe4b0348bfd22a511/t/52a6bc4ee4b00b9d58fba50a/1386658894692/06112013%20English%20Frangility%20Spectrum%20Note.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²⁸ Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*, (UK: ITAD Ltd., 2010), p.20,

<http://www.oecd.org/countries/southsudan/46895095.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

Nathan Associates Inc, *Southern Sudan: Data Gap Analysis for Country Analytic Report*. Report prepared for USAID, (2007) p.3,

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK764.pdf (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

Oxfam Canada, *Country Profile South Sudan* (2013), p3, <http://www.oxfam.ca/sites/default/files/imce/country-profile-south-sudan.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹²⁹ The Sudan Tribune, "Sudan Ranks at Bottom End of Latest UN Development Index," 18 March 2013,

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45886> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

profile of the challenging gender dynamics in South Sudan. In terms of gender-based violence, women in South Sudan endured high levels of gender-based violence during the 21-year civil war, including forced marriage, prostitution and rape.¹³⁰ The more recent conflict in the country has contributed to more severe and widespread gender-based violence in the country, including rape, sexual assault, physical assault and/or psychological abuse.¹³¹ The UN Envoy for Sexual Violence in Conflict recently concluded that sexual violence is ‘rampant’ in the country and among the worst she had seen¹³². However, many of those who commit these abuses are not pursued. Furthermore, victims of gender-based sexual abuses are often unwilling, or unable, to file a complaint due to social stigma, a lack of available and effective institutions, and the costs of reporting complaints.¹³³ Furthermore, there are no civil laws that cover gender-based violence. This situation thus often results in such cases being sent to customary courts whose decisions can run counter to women’s interests.¹³⁴

The health and education outcomes of women further illustrate the gender-based challenges in the country. South Sudan has one of the highest rates of maternal mortality (2,054/100,000 live births). Over 85% of births take place at home with no skilled birth attendant.¹³⁵ In addition, the illiteracy rate for women is over 90%.¹³⁶ Both of these outcomes are, in part, related to the protracted civil war. During this period, educational institutions and health centres were damaged or displaced.¹³⁷ Gender inequalities within the household can also limit progress on these outcomes. For instance, girls’ education has traditionally been seen as relatively less important than that of boys in South Sudan. This can, in part, be attributed to the belief that while girls join other families through marriage, boys are heirs to the family’s wealth and worthy of investment.¹³⁸

Early and forced marriage also negatively impact education and health outcomes. Young women who become pregnant at early ages are often unable to complete further schooling due to subsequent family and domestic responsibilities.¹³⁹ Neither the Transitional Constitution, nor customary law, specifies a legal marital age. This situation makes it more difficult to address early and forced marriage in the country, which remains prevalent - 17% of girls are married before the age of 16, and over 40% are married before their 18th birthday.¹⁴⁰

Women’s ability to exercise their socio-economics rights is also constrained in South Sudan. Notably, there are inconsistencies between the equality of rights for women and men outlined in the bill of rights (in the Interim Constitution of South Sudan), and those accorded to men and women in customary law and practices.¹⁴¹ For instance, women’s exclusion from decision-making in traditional and customary law makes it difficult to assert their rights, such as inheritance and property rights.¹⁴² Although the judiciary in South Sudan includes the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, High Courts and County Courts, customary

¹³⁰ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, The SUDD Institute, (Juba: The SUDD Institute, 2014), p.24, <http://suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/Gender-Equality/fmtSR.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹³¹ CARE, *The Girl Has No Rights; Gender-based violence in South Sudan*, (2014), p.3, http://www.care-international.org/UploadDocument/files/CARE_The%20Girl%20Has%20No%20Rights_GBV%20in%20South%20Sudan.pdf (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

Louis Charbonneau, “South Sudan Sexual Violence ‘Rampant,’ Two-Year-Old Raped: U.N.”

¹³² Louis Charbonneau, “South Sudan Sexual Violence ‘Rampant,’ Two-Year-Old Raped: U.N.”

¹³³ CARE, *The Girl Has No Rights; Gender-based violence in South Sudan*, p.7-8.

Joint Donor Team, *Factsheet – Gender Equality*, (2011), p1, http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Gender_fact_sheet_update_sep_2011.pdf (Retrieved February 18, 2005)

Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.25.

¹³⁴ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.26.

¹³⁵ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.19.

Southern Sudan Household Survey 2010, quoted in DFATD *South Sudan Country Development Strategy 2013-2018*, p.3.

¹³⁶ Maxwell, Daniel, Kirsten Gelsdorf and Martina Santschi, *Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan*, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, Overseas Development Institute (London: ODI, 2012), p.21, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7716.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹³⁷ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.14, 23.

¹³⁸ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.15, 35.

¹³⁹ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.19.

¹⁴⁰ Sudan CDPF 2009-2014, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, p.5 (EDRMS 4562499)

Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.18-19.

¹⁴¹ Bennett, J., S. Pantaliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*, p.121.

¹⁴² Sudan CDPF 2009-2014, Annex D – Gender Equality Strategy, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, p.4.

law and courts (County Courts) are the most prevalent.¹⁴³ Notwithstanding these challenges, women's participation in the political sphere has improved in the past few years. For instance, in its interim Constitution, the Government of South Sudan committed to 25% female representation at all levels of government. Moreover, the government recently announced its intention to increase female representation to 35% in the proposed permanent Constitution.¹⁴⁴ Some suggest these commitments can be attributed to the government's recognition of women's contribution to independence and society more generally.¹⁴⁵ More generally, the Government of South Sudan has identified gender equality as one of its seven cross-cutting issues in the country's National Development Plan (2011-13).¹⁴⁶ In addition, the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare has established Gender Focal Points in all government ministries and institutions to mainstream gender across government.

These recent political commitments are an important step toward elevating women's issues and participation in the political sphere. However, the government's follow-through on these commitments has varied. For instance, it has been argued that the key Ministry (Gender, Child, and Social Welfare) responsible for policy development and implementation in these sectors, as well as the Gender Focal Points, lack sufficient financial and human resource capacity.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the 25% target of women in all levels of government has not yet been met.¹⁴⁸ Lastly, the National Gender Policy and Gender Policy Strategic Plan remain in draft forms – though delays in policy development and implementation are common across sectors in South Sudan.¹⁴⁹ In addition, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been criticized for not meaningfully including women's issues. For instance, gender inequality was not included as a factor influencing security or the sharing of power and wealth.¹⁵⁰

At the donor level, gender equality is neither systematically promoted, nor typically advanced as a priority. Consequently, there has been inconsistent attention to gender equality issues.¹⁵¹ In addition, there may be a lack of technical capacity among government and development practitioners in South Sudan implementing gender-based initiatives.¹⁵² More recently, donors have begun to work together to foster coordination on gender equality in project/program design and implementation.¹⁵³ For instance, a gender working committee was recently established to bring together donors, UN agencies, and the Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare.¹⁵⁴

2.7 Environmental Situation

The major environmental concerns in South Sudan involve the sustainable management of natural and agricultural resources, as well as access to safe drinking water and sanitation.¹⁵⁵ The causes of these

¹⁴³ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.26.

¹⁴⁴ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.28.

Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*, p.122.

¹⁴⁵ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.28.

The Institute for Inclusive Security and UN Women, *Increasing Women's Participation and Engagement in Planning for Peace: the 2011 gender symposium and international engagement conference for South Sudan* (2012), p.1-2, http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Increasing-Womens-Participation_South-Sudan.pdf (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹⁴⁶ Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, (Juba, 2011), p.xx, <http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/South-Sudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.33.

¹⁴⁷ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.6.

¹⁴⁸ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.29.

Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*, p.122.

¹⁴⁹ Jane Kani Edward, *Special Report – A Strategy for Achieving Gender Equality in South Sudan*, p.32.

¹⁵⁰ Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*, p.121.

¹⁵¹ Sudan CDPF 2009-2014, Annex D – Gender Strategy, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, (p.9) (EDRMS 4549999)

¹⁵² Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Annex 6 - Gender*, p.13.

¹⁵³ Sudan CDPF 2009-2014, Annex D - Gender Equality Strategy, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, (p.9) (EDRMS 4549999)

¹⁵⁴ Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Annex 6 - Gender*, p.9.

¹⁵⁵ South Sudan Ministry of the Environment and UNDP South Sudan, *Environmental Impacts, Risks and Opportunities Assessment: Natural resources management and climate change in South Sudan* (2012) p.4,

environmental challenges are diverse. Unsustainable agricultural practices are common (particularly among displaced persons), leading to environmental degradation, contaminated water, soil erosion, and food insecurity. In addition, the negative effects of climate change, notably desertification, additional soil erosion, and decreased agricultural output, contribute to difficult environmental conditions by reducing the amount of cultivatable land.¹⁵⁶ Given that the livelihoods of most South Sudanese, particularly in rural areas, depend on natural resources, the depletion of such resources can contribute to conflict and instability.¹⁵⁷ For instance, UNEP (2009) has found that *natural resources are a factor in almost half of all intrastate conflicts*.¹⁵⁸

A considerable amount of the country's public infrastructure was also damaged or destroyed due to the civil war. Consequently, almost half the population lacks access to improved sources of drinking water. Furthermore, the vast majority do not have access to basic housing and sanitation (over 80% live in mud hut structures or tukuls).¹⁵⁹ Limited government investment and capacity to address environmental concerns exacerbates this situation. For instance, many public institutions (i.e. schools and health facilities) lack a sufficient number of latrines, water pumps or incinerators.¹⁶⁰ The population also remains vulnerable to natural disasters due to limited environmental management and disaster preparation by the government.¹⁶¹ Lastly, the government's singular dependence on the oil sector (which generates over 95% of fiscal revenue, making South Sudan the most oil dependent country in the world) creates the conditions for environmental risks, such as oil spills, water contamination, and inadequate disposal of hazardous materials used in drilling.¹⁶²

The Government of South Sudan has identified the environment as one of its seven cross-cutting themes. It is focusing on incorporating environmental considerations into policy development and implementation, such as developing environmental policy and laws for sustainable natural resource management. Currently, an Environmental Bill and National Environmental Policy have been drafted, but the former has not yet been endorsed.¹⁶³ Key targets related to these initiatives include environmental and social impact assessments for all development interventions, as well as the development of an early warning system for natural disasters.¹⁶⁴ Finally, the GRSS plans to increase the number of latrines, water points, incinerators and hygienic pits in schools and health care facilities to increase sanitation at the

<http://www.ss.undp.org/content/dam/southsudan/library/Reports/southsudanotherdocuments/EIRO%20Report-fr-website.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

South Sudan Program Annual Country Report 2011/12, South Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, (p.6) (EDRMS 6087420)

¹⁵⁶ South Sudan Ministry of the Environment and UNDP South Sudan, *Environmental Impacts, Risks and Opportunities Assessment: Natural resources management and climate change in South Sudan*, p12.

Susan Young, *A Strategic Environmental Assessment of Canada's Whole of Government Engagement in Sudan – Final Report*, prepared for DFATD, (2009), p.20.

¹⁵⁷ Sudan Country Development Programming Framework (2009-2014), Annex E – Environment, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, p.1, (EDRMS 4514517)

¹⁵⁸ United Nations Environment Program, *From Conflict to Peacebuilding, the Role of Natural Resources and the Environment* (2009), p5,

http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

Quoted in Susan Young, *A Strategic Environmental Assessment of Canada's Whole of Government Engagement in Sudan – Final Report*, (2009), p.9.

¹⁵⁹ Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, p.76.

Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, *Key Indicators for Southern Sudan*, p.3.

¹⁶⁰ Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, p.103.

¹⁶¹ Sudan CDPF (2009-2014), Sudan Country Program, xCIDA (p.5)

¹⁶² South Sudan Ministry of the Environment and UNDP South Sudan, *Environmental Impacts, Risks and Opportunities Assessment: Natural resources management and climate change in South Sudan*, p.35.

World Bank, "South Sudan Overview," last modified October 10 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

¹⁶³ South Sudan Ministry of the Environment and UNDP South Sudan, *Environmental Impacts, Risks and Opportunities Assessment: Natural resources management and climate change in South Sudan*, p.25.

Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, p.86.

¹⁶⁴ Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, p.64, p.232.

community level.¹⁶⁵ However, the government has also flagged the need to increase technical capacity to adequately perform this function.¹⁶⁶

3. Donors and Aid Effectiveness in South Sudan

According to DAC statistics on total net ODA to South Sudan, the country's largest bilateral donors since independence in July 2011 and in 2012 have been the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada and Japan. Each of these donors has provided more than \$100 million in bilateral assistance during this period (see figure below). Specifically, Canada's aid to South Sudan is fourth largest among all DAC donors, varying between roughly US\$ 50-65 million. However, it remains modest, at less than 5% of total ODA received by South Sudan.

Figure 5 – ODA Total net disbursements to South Sudan from 2011 to 2012 (USD millions)¹⁶⁷

Donor	Rank	2011	2012	Total	Total (as % of DAC Countries, Total)
United States	1	707.42	773.34	1480.76	59.90%
United Kingdom	2	83	171.97	254.97	10.31%
Norway	3	60.27	73.59	133.86	5.41%
Canada	4	48.95	65.55	114.5	4.63%
Japan	5	25.56	75.03	100.59	4.07%
Sweden	6	10.01	72.23	82.24	3.33%
Denmark	7	35.76	37.39	73.15	2.96%
Netherlands	8	24.4	45.17	69.57	2.81%
Germany	9	17.37	34.39	51.76	2.09%
Australia	10	2.65	23.15	25.8	1.04%
Switzerland	11	8.22	15.56	23.78	0.96%
Finland	12	2.36	13.43	15.79	0.64%
Ireland	13	6.53	8.35	14.88	0.60%
Belgium	14	6.82	2.34	9.16	0.37%
Italy	15	0.18	8.95	9.13	0.37%
France	16	0.26	3.52	3.78	0.15%
Spain	17	..	2.04	2.04	0.08%
Korea	18	0.03	1.77	1.8	0.07%
Slovak Republic	19	0.72	0.7	1.42	0.06%
Austria	20	0.2	0.93	1.13	0.05%
New Zealand	21	0.79	..	0.79	0.03%
Luxembourg	22	..	0.73	0.73	0.03%
Poland	23	..	0.45	0.45	0.02%

¹⁶⁵ Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, p.103.

¹⁶⁶ Government of South Sudan, *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all*, p.xviii.

¹⁶⁷ OECD Statextracts, "Total Official Development Flows by Country and Region," OECD, data extracted 03 July 2014, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REF_TOTAL_ODF# (Retrieved March 6 2015)

Total, DAC Countries	1041.5	1430.62	2472.12	100.00%
DAC Countries, Total	1041.5	1430.62	2472.12	92.73%
Multilateral, Total	45.78	146.57	192.35	7.21%
Non-DAC Countries, Total	0.72	0.8	1.52	0.06%
Private Donors, Total	0.29	0.99	1.28	0.05%
All Donors, Total	1088	1578	2666	100.00%

Assessing the extent to which the South Sudan Country Program addressed (retrospective) and can address (prospective) these challenges, including the recommendations of the Joint donor evaluation, forms the central focus of the upcoming Country Program Evaluation (CPE) of the South Sudan program. Addressing the political, economic, social and human rights challenges in South Sudan requires transforming attitudes, structures, relationships and behaviours in four key domains, namely socio-economic development, good governance, justice and security institutions and truth and reconciliation, as pictured in Figure 5, The Ustein Palette (see next page).

This palette informed the structure and approach of a Multi-donor evaluation of South Sudan which included recommendations on the kind of interventions that donors should be considering, not the least of which was the importance of ensuring that donor strategies consider the key drivers of conflict, including security, policing and rule of law.¹⁶⁸ While most members of the donor community focused efforts on socio-economic development, good governance and truth and reconciliation, establishing mechanisms and processes to assist the GRSS to address their needs, the United Nations Mission assists in the reform of security institutions¹⁶⁹. However, some have criticized the international community for focusing too much on technical matters (i.e. improved services, infrastructure) at the expense of the political dimensions of state-building. Donors must now rapidly transition from post-conflict recovery, to humanitarian relief in a conflict affected state.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ The Evaluation found that donor strategies tended to overemphasize basic services even though programming focused on security, policing and rule of law, all essential to state formation, better addressed the key drivers of conflict.


Bennett, J., S. Pantuliana, W. Fenton, A. Vaux, C. Barnett, and E. Brusset, *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010*.

¹⁶⁹ Initially put in place for one year following independence, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan was comprised of 7000 military personnel and 900 civilian police personnel with a mandate to assist the Government in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians; and help the authorities in developing capacity to provide security, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors in the country. In March 2014 UNMISS was increased to 12,500 military personnel and 1,323 police personnel with a changed mandate focused on protecting civilians; facilitating humanitarian assistance; monitoring and reporting on human rights; and preventing further inter-communal violence.

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, "Mission Home," last modified May 27 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/index.shtml> (Retrieved February 18, 2015).

The Africa Union, supported by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is leading diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. The US and the UK also provided technical assistance, material support and training to the GRSS Army.

¹⁷⁰ Sara Pantuliano, "Donor-driven technical fixes failed South Sudan: It's time to get political," *Transconflict*, 20 January 2014, <http://www.transconflict.com/2014/01/donor-driven-technical-fixes-failed-south-sudan-time-get-political-201/> (Retrieved February 18, 2015), quoted in Daniel Maxwell and Martina Santschi, *From Post-Conflict Recovery and State Building to a Renewed Humanitarian Emergency: A Brief Reflection on South Sudan*, p.3.

Figure 6: The Ustein Palette

The Government of South Sudan has also developed a framework, the **South Sudan Development Plan**, to outline South Sudan's medium-term development and aid effectiveness agenda from 2011-2013 (later extended to 2015), which DFATD and other donors aim to support through their development programming to South Sudan. The government also published a 2011 framework, the **Aid Strategy for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan**, to guide development partners and improve the effectiveness of development assistance and humanitarian aid delivery in South Sudan by aligning funding with the Government's core priorities. The wealth of guidance from the OECD on Fragile and Conflict-Affected states should also inform donor engagement.¹⁷¹ The extent to which donors are being guided by the overarching aims of preventing conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding will ensure the relevance and effectiveness of donor engagement in general, and DFATD in particular, given South Sudan's extremely challenging programming context.

A key development in aid effectiveness affected by the current instability in South Sudan has been the New Deal Compact. Set to begin in December 2013, this Compact would have enabled a common understanding and approach among donors for supporting South Sudan and its government. However since the conflict, it appears to be postponed indefinitely.¹⁷² Moreover, relations between the Government of South Sudan and the international community have been shifting. Government officials

¹⁷¹ Good Humanitarian Donorship, "Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship," last modified in 2013, <http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/ghd/gns/4/principles-good-practice-ghd.html> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, (2007), <http://www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates/> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do Better?* (2011), <http://www.u4.no/recommended-reading/international-engagement-in-fragile-states-cant-we-do-better/downloadasset/2377> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance* (2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/supporting-statebuilding-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264074989-en (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success?* (2011), <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4311211ec003.pdf?expires=1424291442&id=id&accname=ocid54006162&checksum=B5F36BF762E3F598D909F39F60F9B183> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*, (2013), <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/49151944.pdf> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series* (2012), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/international-support-to-post-conflict-transition_5kg0t08mtm5b.pdf?contentType=%2fns%2fBook%2c%2fns%2fOECDBook&itemId=%2fcontent%2fbook%2f9789264168336-en&mimeType=application%2fpdf&containerItemId=%2fcontent%2fserial%2f19900988&accessItemIds=%2fcontent%2fserial%2f19900864%2c (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Publication Series: Conflict and Fragility*, <http://oecd.org/dac/publicationsseriesconflictandfragility.htm> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)
 See also the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

¹⁷² Draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

purport that external actors (particularly humanitarian actors) are not transparent about their activities and are engaging in “state avoiding behaviour”. However, the latter claim they are concerned about partnering with those involved in the conflict and potential human rights violations. Thus, some international actors are ‘re-negotiating’ the nature of their relationship with the Government of South Sudan, with some avoiding the government entirely, others focusing on local governments, and still others maintaining a relationship with the Government of South Sudan.¹⁷³

4. xCIDA/DFATD’s Program in South Sudan

4.1 Whole-of-Government Context

The xCIDA and DFATD’s engagement in Sudan and South Sudan has shifted significantly over the past few decades in response to instability and conflict in the country. In 1989, Canadian bilateral assistance to Sudan was suspended due to the country’s poor human rights records following the coup by President Omar al-Bashir. Humanitarian aid, however, continued during this period. Ten years later the xCIDA resumed its efforts on the ground, and focused its support on the peace process. In 2005, bilateral assistance increased and in 2008 a whole-of-government approach was proposed, involving the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (xDFAIT) and xCIDA, as well as the Department of National Defense and Royal Canadian Mounted Police¹⁷⁴.

This whole-of-government approach centered on three key objectives: containing violence and enhancing security; reducing vulnerability and saving lives; and building longer-term stabilities and resilience. To fulfill these objectives, Canada relied on three key pillars: **aid** (humanitarian assistance and early recovery); **diplomacy** (advocacy and peacebuilding) and **security** (support to UN peacekeeping missions). These pillars were meant to reinforce Canadian foreign policy priorities related to the promotion of human rights, freedom, good governance and democracy, as well as responding to the interests of Canadians and the international community to engage in diplomatic, development and peace efforts in Sudan. The responsibility areas of implicated Canadian departments are outlined below:

xDFAIT – Sudan Task Force

DFAIT’s Sudan Task Force led on policy coherence, operational support and programming coordination of Canada’s whole-of-government engagement, as well as Canada’s diplomacy and advocacy objectives focused on support to the CPA and the Darfur peace process.

xDFAIT – Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF)

The GPSF was the primary instrument for Canada’s peace building programming in Sudan, and more generally supported efforts to strengthen security, peace, justice and the rule of law. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) had overall responsibility for administering the GPSF.

Department of National Defence (DND)

DND contributed personnel and equipment to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

RCMP – International Police Peacekeeping Programme

The RCMP has contributed officers to UNMIS to train and mentor local police officers serving in South Sudan.

¹⁷³ Maxwell and Santschi, *From Post-Conflict Recovery and State Building to a Renewed Humanitarian Emergency: A Brief Reflection on South Sudan*, p.3, p.6.

Much of the information from this paragraph was drawn from the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy 2014-2016 for South Sudan, South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

¹⁷⁴ Note –the majority of this information was drawn from the Sudan Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF): 2009-2014. Sudan Country Program, xCIDA (EDRMS 4562499).

Once South Sudan became an independent country in 2011, the Task Force’s mandate was modified to include South Sudan.

Canada has also contributed to UNMISS (United Nations Mission to South Sudan) since the beginning of the mission in July 2011, and sent police officers in support of UNMISS and UNDP’s Community Security and Arms Control Initiative from 2005 to late 2013 via the Canadian Police Arrangement. In early 2014, Canada’s Minister of National Defence extended Canada’s military mandate in UNMISS to March 2015.

Lastly, Canada’s mission in South Sudan also supports local NGOs in small scale projects focused on local priorities and needs through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), in relation to Canada’s foreign policy objectives and bilateral program goals.¹⁷⁵

4.2 xCIDA’s Sudan Country Program

4.2.1 Strategic Focus and Objectives 2009-2014

Canada identified Sudan (including the former autonomous region of Southern Sudan) as a priority fragile state in 2006. Once South Sudan became independent in 2011, the xCIDA developed a program focused on the newly emerged country. Given the time frame of the evaluation (2009-2014), the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) for Sudan 2009-2014 is outlined below (which included what was then the autonomous region of Southern Sudan). In a subsequent section, key elements of the *draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016)* are outlined. The South Sudan program within DFATD is finalising this Interim Strategy, and may be in a position to provide a final version when a Country Program Evaluation is launched.

It is important to note that during the development of the guidelines for planning and reporting in 2009, and, following direction from the Minister, Programs were expected to produce a Country Strategy (CS) with a notional set of expected results. The CS was meant to provide policy cover for broad programming areas which were to be detailed as part of the CDPF, including the development of a Logic Model (LM) (depicting the theory of change for the program), a Performance Management Framework (PMF) and a range of other annexes including a conflict and fragility analysis. Based on the Guidelines at the time, the expected results at the intermediate outcome level were meant to capture all channels of Agency funding. In terms of the approval process, while the Minister approved the CS, the Regional Director General for each geographic branch approved the CDPF and all annexes. The following summer when it came time to report, programs were asked to report on the CS as this was what had been approved by the Minister. Since the CS did not have a LM/PMF, programs found themselves reporting on what were initially notional and soon became the accepted suite of program results. As a result, there are inconsistencies between the results in the CS and those in the LM/PMF and, more importantly, the use of evidence and data from indicators was unevenly applied across the then Geographic Branch as not every program aligned their LM/PMF to the results in the CS.

Strategic Objectives for xCIDA’s Sudan Country Program (2009-2014)

The overall objective of xCIDA’s Sudan Program during the CDPF period (2009-2014) was to support all efforts to implement the peace agreements. In order to achieve this objective, the Sudan Program focused on strengthening enabling conditions for peace and prosperity, including: a stronger, more legitimate state; access to emergency and basic services by vulnerable people; and more resilient and productive citizens (particularly at-risk youth) with improved livelihoods.

¹⁷⁵ Draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

Three areas of focus were chosen for xCIDA programming during this period: **Children and Youth, Food Security, and Governance**. A fourth key sector, **Humanitarian Assistance**, was included as part the program's Whole-of-Agency efforts. The section below outlines xCIDA's specific objectives related to each of these sectors of focus (as outlined in the Objectives and Strategic Focus Section of the 2009 Sudan Program CDPF)¹⁷⁶.

1) Children and Youth (Objectives)

- Increase the provision of literacy, numeric and alternative learning for those who have missed basic education and can benefit from accelerated curriculum that increases their chances for higher-level livelihood and employment skills development.
- Increase the provision of employment and livelihood skills development (e.g., work force training and skills development for employment) for young people unable to complete secondary education due to war and poverty.
- Increase the provision of health assistance and life-skills education focused on risk reduction including reproductive and psychosocial services to address the needs of vulnerable at risk young people, in particular child and young women headed households. As appropriate, support for the provision of health services will also focus on basic water and sanitation.
- Strengthen the administrative (including financial management), technical expertise and operational capacity and increase the policy-relevant knowledge among targeted government and non-government organizations on the delivery of conflict-sensitive and gender appropriate education and health services tailored to address the challenges and opportunities for children and youth aged 12-24.

2) Food Security (Objectives)¹⁷⁷

- Promote resilience at the rural community level, based on a livelihoods analysis of the local context. This means focusing on small-scale subsistence farming and building on existing coping strategies.
- Identify specific opportunities for livelihoods programming that will target those groups most vulnerable to food insecurity – women, IDPs/returnees and ex-combatants. Such programming should take into account the varied gender roles in the livelihoods sector as well as conflict-sensitive practices that can promote stability, rather than conflict, between IDPs/returnees and host communities.
- Pursue integrated approaches to programming that can build on xCIDA's efforts in other areas of thematic focus, for instance, governance through capacity building of agricultural institutions, or security/CPA implementation through livelihoods support within the DDR process. An integrated approach would also have xCIDA increase efforts to coordinate programming with other donors.

The Sudan Program's Food Security Strategy also involved supporting immediate food aid to vulnerable populations, and governance capacity building to the Government of South Sudan, through humanitarian assistance and governance

3) Governance (Objectives)

- Increase understanding of democracy and the role of citizens in democratic processes through civic and voter education, building on Canada's reputation and expertise in electoral support, while also targeting vulnerable and marginalized groups such as women and IDPs/returnees.
- Provide technical support to the administration of the 2011 national referendum on Southern independence, such as increased understanding of the political, legislative, communication and

¹⁷⁶ Sudan CDPF (2009-2014), Sudan Country Program, xCIDA, p.10-12, (EDRMS 4562499)

¹⁷⁷ Note – these objectives also support the 2005 Sudan Joint Assessment Mission, and 2007 National Food Security Action Plan.

information requirements necessary for effective referendum preparation among Sudanese referendum decision makers.

- Support state-building activities that will enable government and civil society in South Sudan to deliver basic services to show the benefits of peace and ensure sustainability of development efforts. The extensive institutional weaknesses of the GRSS mean that there are significant opportunities to support donor coordinated programs to train GRSS officials in good management, as well as to support basic skills development to manage and deliver basic social services where gaps in services remain.

4.2.2 Intermediate Outcomes (2009-2012)¹⁷⁸

The following section outlines the expected results for the Sudan program (which included South Sudan until FY 2012/13), after which a Sudan Bilateral Program Transition Strategy,¹⁷⁹ South Sudan Country Strategy,¹⁸⁰ and the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016) were developed. The ultimate outcome of the Sudan Program during this period (2009-2012) was increased stability, and longer-term sustainable economic prosperity and social well-being for Sudanese men, women, girls and boys. In line with this goal, xCIDA's interventions in the country aimed to produce the following intermediate outcomes:

INTO 1- Decreased morbidity and mortality among crisis-affected male and female populations

- *Key activities:* provide humanitarian assistance to those most in need.

INTO 2- Men, women and their households increase subsistence agriculture production, are more resilient and cope better with the physical, nutritional, and economic risks and vulnerabilities related to ongoing instability

- *Key activities:* support knowledge, skills and resources related to subsistence agricultural and food production.

INTO 3- At risk young males and females and girls and boys aged 12-24 increase their social and economic contributions to their communities and are better able to cope and manage risks and vulnerabilities related to ongoing instability

- *Key activities:* support the provision of basic health and education, as well as development of employment and livelihood skills for at-risk children and youth.

INTO 4- State institutions and Sudanese women, men, young males and females are better able to execute and actively participate in democratic processes and manage public resources.

- *Key activities:* support civic and voter education for upcoming elections, provide technical assistance for referendum planning, and help build the Government of South Sudan's capacity for improved public financial management.

4.2.3 Cross-Cutting Themes

1- Gender Equality:

The CDPF's Gender Equality Strategy outlined, among others, the following key elements (and associated objectives) to effectively address gender equality (GE) needs in Sudan programming:

¹⁷⁸ Sudan CDPF (2009-2014), Annex A - Sudan Program Level Logic Model, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA ([EDRMS 4567400](#)).

¹⁷⁹ Sudan Bilateral Program Transition Strategy, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA ([EDRMS 6500673](#)).

¹⁸⁰ Draft South Sudan Country Strategy ([EDRMS 5652246](#)) replaced by draft Country Development Strategy 2013-2018 ([EDRMS 6816762](#)), and later the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD ([EDRMS 7029487](#))

- Increased GE capacity building within the team
 - Increase xCIDA's knowledge of gender issues in Sudan, and its understanding of the need for and benefits of a more gender-focused approach to addressing fragility.
 - Develop/provide tools for GE implementation based on a useful knowledge base of lessons learned and successful approaches to incorporating gender issues in Sudan and in fragile states programming.
 - Ensure that quality gender analysis is applied by xCIDA and shared with Government and other donors in order to strengthen policy dialogue and program design/implementation.
- Focused engagement with Sudanese women's groups in the context of policy dialogue and overall programming
 - Strengthen implementation in Sudan of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which Canada was instrumental in supporting;
 - Ensure that women's and girls' voices are heard to a greater extent in program/project design, implementation and monitoring, for instance, by including performance indicators related to engagement with women's groups;
 - Build on the significant role that women's organizations have already been playing in the peace-building and reconstruction process (e.g. the Women's Preparatory Conference in the 2008 Oslo Donor Consortium; the Common Agenda of Southern Sudanese women's organizations for the 2010 elections) as well as in advocacy and in delivery of services and programs.
- Secure integration of gender equality in xCIDA's investments in Sudan, as well as increased resources for specialized advice and support in the field and HQ.
 - Advocate for funding of gender equality initiatives, specific gender equality budget lines and/or a minimum, mandatory criteria for gender analysis, results and indicators in new pooled funding arrangements;
 - Advocate for the greater inclusion of women and girls and greater attention to gender equality issues, in measures to address fragility in Sudan over the coming 5 years;
 - Commit to a minimum budget line for GE in all new xCIDA-funded projects.

The GE Strategy also highlighted key challenges xCIDA would face in promoting gender equality in Sudan:

- **volatile fragile state context:** which often contributes to a violation of women's and girl's human rights;
- **new aid modalities:** engagement with multilaterals and donor partnerships, as well as Canada's whole-of-government engagement in Sudan, increase the complexity of programming and results reporting on gender equality;
- **data limitations:** lack of reliable and valid gender sensitive, sex disaggregated data; and
- **accountability of other donors in gender equality:** the absence of dedicated funding human resources for GE built into pooled funds has increased the onus on xCIDA to advocate for GE in this context.

2- Environmental Sustainability:

When the 2009 CDPF was finalised, the Sudan program had not yet conducted a Strategic Environmental Assessment (set for 2010). The program was therefore largely guided by the Whole of Government SEA for Sudan (2009).¹⁸¹ A few key environmental implications of the CDPF were nonetheless identified, such as:

¹⁸¹ Sudan CDPF (2009-2014), Annex E –Environmental Sustainability Analysis, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA (EDRMS 4514517)

- **Food Security:** the key environmental issues in Sudan relate to land erosion, water scarcity and climate, leading to rising food prices. Weak policy and capacity in the country may lead to unsustainable methods of agricultural production, and/or poor use of resources. xCIDA could adopt a sustainable livelihoods approach to help integrate environmental issues in Sudan. For instance, environmental projects could be included within initiatives for the disarming and re-integration of combatants. In addition, strategies to encourage diversification of livelihoods would reduce pressure on key natural resources.
- **Children and Youth:** children are often the most at risk of social, economic and conflict challenges; sustainable environmental management can improve their well-being. For instance, sustainable management of resources will lead to fewer children travelling to find resources and reduce risks to their health. IN addition, introducing environmental issues into curricula, school design and facilities can improve educational outcomes.
- **Governance:** good governance can help prevent the exploitation of natural resources and promote their sustainable management. Weak governance can lead, among other issues, to corrupt practices related to natural resource extraction, and inefficient delivery of services (i.e. water, waste management) which can negatively impact the poor. xCIDA programming could strengthen the capacity of government authorities to fight against corruption in managing natural resources, as well as the environmental management skills for NGOs.

The main development recommendations from the Whole-of-Government SEA¹⁸² (2009) are also identified below:

- Enhance Canadian engagement by ensuring complementarity with UNEP and other environmental-focused actors on environmental governance and natural resource management issues;
- Put an emphasis on the transparent, consultative participation stakeholders (at all levels) to achieve science-based sustainable and equitable livelihoods, and build in long-term environmental resilience, particular in the areas of climate change and desertification;
- Design community development programming that ensures sustainable and equitable natural resource use and food security, and addresses longer-term environmental resilience issues; and
- Ensure humanitarian and other efforts that work closely with security forces have the capacity to contribute to conflict mitigation with respect to environmental/natural resource triggers.

4.2.4 Lessons Learned

The 2009 CDPF exercise also outlined the following lessons learned to consider in future programming:

1. Programming in Sudan must start with the context – taking into account the volatile operational environment and responding flexibly to an ever-changing reality, especially the upcoming elections and referendums;
2. Effective donor responses at this time will require a combination of short and long-term interventions. The “early recovery” gap between humanitarian assistance and development cannot be neglected;
3. With myriad challenges in Sudan, Canada will only have a demonstrable impact by co-ordinating efforts with other donors/civil society and focusing programming on areas of comparative advantage;
4. Programming must be at a minimum conflict-sensitive, if not conflict responsive. This means taking a Do No Harm approach and seeking opportunities to build the potential of vulnerable/marginalized groups – particularly women.

¹⁸² Susan Young, *A Strategic Environmental Assessment of Canada's Whole of Government Engagement in Sudan – Final Report*, prepared for DFATD, p.3-4.

5. Fostering buy-in from beneficiaries is vital as it brings local knowledge and increases security for xCIDA’s implementing partners;
6. Programming in Sudan is inherently expensive due to volatile security, vast geography and weak infrastructure; and
7. Building the capacity of the state is imperative to long-term development prospects, paving the way for a donor exit-strategy.

Drawing on these experiences, the document highlighted the following potential value-added areas for xCIDA programming going forward: gender equality, environmental sustainability, food security, and referendum implementation.

As mentioned, after South Sudan achieved independence on July 2011, the xCIDA developed a new country program to reflect this reality. The next section outlines the main sectors of focus, as well as associated key objectives, as laid out in the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016).

4.3 South Sudan Country Program: Draft Strategic Development Objectives (2014-2016)

Since the independence of South Sudan in 2011, xCIDA has developed a series of draft Program-level planning documents to guide operations in the new country. However, none of these planning documents (outlined below) have been formally approved by senior management:

- Draft Country Development Strategy for South Sudan (2013-2018) and accompanying Program-Level Logic Model (2013-2018);
- Draft South Sudan Investment Plan (2013); and
- Draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016).

The 2009 Sudan CDPF and Country Strategy (which included what was then the Autonomous region of South Sudan) are the only formally approved planning documents, and would be of particular relevance for the retrospective analyses of this evaluation. Regarding the prospective aspects of this evaluation, the most recent draft planning document for South Sudan, i.e. the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), would be relevant, assuming it is approved once the formal Country Program Evaluation is underway. Consequently, the Interim Strategy is outlined in more detail below.

xCIDA/DFATD Draft Bilateral Strategic Objectives in South Sudan

As outlined in the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), DFATD’s development contribution in South Sudan would focus on three thematic priorities: **children and youth (maternal, newborn and child health)**; **food security**; and **advancing democracy**. Programming will also be supported by the integration of three cross-cutting themes: gender equality, environment and governance. Looking forward, and, on the assumption the situation in South Sudan stabilizes, the Program is keen to explore broadening and deepening their current investments in value chain agriculture (Sustainable Economic Growth or SEG) as the fourth pillar. A strategy, options and prioritization of each of the four pillars should form part of the recommendations emerging from the prospective part of this evaluation.

Returning to the current Interim Bilateral Development Strategy, proposed programming in these areas are to be guided by the following objectives¹⁸³:

1. Children and Youth - Improved Maternal, Newborn and Child Health

¹⁸³ Note – this section reflects a summary of the draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

- **Improve the delivery of basic and life-saving maternal newborn and child health service** across the continuum of care, including pre-pregnancy to delivery, the immediate postnatal period, and childhood.
- **increase the ability of trained health workers**, especially midwives, to address the health needs of mothers and children.
- **seek opportunities to tackle child protection and the health implications of increased rates of violence against women and girls.**
- ****improve government capacity to plan and monitor the delivery of MNCH services, once stability increases on the ground.***¹⁸⁴

Policy dialogue will focus on official recognition of traditional birth attendants' role in the promotion and delivery of basic MNCH services. As co-chair of the Health Sector Working Group in Juba, Canada is leading donor dialogue with government, focused on ensuring government transfers are increasing for health worker salaries, hospital management, and health service delivery. The aim is to establish a basis for mutual accountability and encourage government ownership for service delivery.

South Sudan is Muskoka Initiative country. Maternal, newborn and child mortality rates in South Sudan are among the worst in the world, and represent an area with limited donor involvement. Emphasis will be placed on basic delivery through all available avenues (i.e. governmental and non-governmental) due to South Sudan's considerable and urgent needs, instead of a focus on strengthening government capacity.

2. Food Security – Boosting Food Production

- **boost food production in order to diversify the risks of losing crops, promote nutritional value, and to provide food for a longer period of time**, such as through the provision of agriculture inputs, agricultural production and technical livelihood training, and the construction of feeder roads to increase access to markets and facilitate the provision of food aid.
- ****enhance market participation of smallholder farmers, develop value chains and improve government capacity to support farming to lay the foundation for agriculture-based economic growth, when feasible on the ground.***

Policy dialogue will focus on increased government spending on agriculture, with particular emphasis on maintenance of roads from farms to markets.

The greatest potential for South Sudan's short to medium term growth is expected to come from small-scale, predominantly family based agriculture and livestock sectors. The above activities will improve the economic enabling environment in South Sudan, and contribute to Canada's economic and trade interests in South Sudan.

3. Advancing democracy

- **support the development of an inclusive reconciliation process and a sustainable peace process** to provide truth and accountability regarding past abuses. Programming could include building the role of an independent and responsible media, and civic participation and engagement in political processes.
- **building the capacity of oversight institutions, such as the National Audit Chamber and National Legislative Assembly.** Programming could also include collaboration with other likeminded countries for governance-related capacity building, or capacity building of the National Electoral Commission in anticipation of a future election.

¹⁸⁴ Note – bullets in this section with a (*), and in italics, refer to objectives that depend on the stability situation in the country.

Policy dialogue will focus on addressing human rights violations, and establishing and reinforcing processes for reconciliation and democratization. Canada, which co-chairs a donor working group in Juba on Reconciliation, has suggested that reconciliation is the most difficult and important area of programming for South Sudan donors. Reconciliation is integral going forward because without healing the situation is likely to worsen. However reconciliation, difficult to measure, requires patience and detailed historical knowledge. Furthermore, to be successful, the process must be domestically driven and ostensibly independent of donors.

These initiatives will contribute to supporting citizen capacity to hold their governments to account, as well as supporting government capacity to meet the needs of its citizens. These initiatives will also contribute to laying the longer-term foundations for peace and stability in South Sudan, as well as address longer-term structural challenges to democratic governance and accountability in the country.

4. Cross-Cutting Themes

- **Gender Equality:** the Program will seek to address health and food security inequalities and the specific needs of women and girls, as well as advance their participation as decision-makers and leaders, particularly in reconciliation.
- **Governance:** governance will be incorporated into each thematic priority, and all programming will take into consideration ethnic divisions and the needs of marginalized groups.
 - **Children and Youth:** programming will help improve government capacity to ensure a more efficient use of government resources for effective and equitable service delivery at the subnational level.
 - **Food Security:** programming will help improve the government’s capacity to undertake strategic planning.
 - **Advancing democracy:** programming will help improve government transparency and accountability by supporting formal and informal institutions critical to democracy and government institutions responsible for accountability.
- **Environment:** Proposed programming activities in MNCH, food security and advancing democracy are not anticipated to have significant negative effects on the environment.

Transition between Sudan and South Sudan Program Documents

Given that the evaluation period extends from 2009-2014, the key program planning documents in use during this period are relevant to this evaluation. These include the following: Sudan CDPF (2009-2014) and accompanying Logic Model (2010), Sudan Country Strategy (2009), as well as the draft South Sudan Country Strategy (2013-2018) and accompanying draft Logic Model (2013), draft Investment Plan (2013/2014), and draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016).

The intermediate outcomes (expected results) from the Logic Models, Annual Country Reports, draft Investment Plan, and the most recent draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016) were synthesized, with feedback from the South Sudan Program. This resulted in the production of a single document mapping how the intermediate outcomes from the Sudan Program fed into the intermediate outcomes in the South Sudan Program (see EDRMS [7090640](#)).

This new synthesized document (and identified intermediate outcomes) can inform evaluation sampling in order to ensure key elements from the main planning documents (that were in use/developed over the evaluation period) are considered. A step-by-step overview of the adjustments made to the intermediate outcomes of the South Sudan bilateral program over the period 2009 - 2014 is provided in tabular format below. *It should be noted, however, that in the absence of “policy cover” per an approved Country Strategy, the intermediate outcomes that governed programming, including reporting, for the South Sudan program were those found in the Annual Country Report.*

Table 2: Evolution of Intermediate Outcomes for the South Sudan Program 2009 - 2014				
Sudan Country Strategy/CDPF/ Logic Model 2009/10 ¹⁸⁵	South Sudan ACR 2011 South Sudan ACR 2012	Draft South Sudan Logic Model (Nov 2013) ¹⁸⁶	Draft South Sudan Investment Plan - (April 2014) ¹⁸⁷	Draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016) ¹⁸⁸
Decreased morbidity and mortality among crisis-affected male and female populations	Reduced vulnerability of crisis-affected people, especially women and children Reduced vulnerability of crisis-affected people, especially women and children	Increased use of quality gender-sensitive maternal, newborn and child health services by women, children and newborns in targeted geographic areas	The program will continue to improve access to MNCH services, training health care workers and strengthening government health systems, when conditions permit	Increased access to quality maternal, newborn and child health services by women, children and newborns
Men, women and their households increase subsistence agriculture production, are more resilient and cope better with the physical, nutritional and economic risks and vulnerabilities related to ongoing stability	Increased food production, market participation and income by rural households Economically sustainable rural communities	Increased agriculture and fisheries production and related market opportunities for smallholder farmers/fisherfolk, especially women and youth in targeted geographic areas	The program will continue to build the capacity of smallholder farmers to increase food production, generate income and assist farmers and fisherfolk to access markets when conditions permit	Increased access to locally produced/harvested food for vulnerable populations
At risk young men and women and girls and boys aged 12-24 increase their social and economic contributions to their communities and are better able to cope and manage risks and vulnerabilities related to ongoing instability	Improved water supply, education and basic maternal health Improved water supply, education and basic maternal health	Increased agriculture and fisheries production and related market opportunities for smallholder farmers/fisherfolk, especially women and youth in targeted geographic areas	The program will continue to build the capacity of smallholder farmers to increase food production, generate income and assist farmers and fisherfolk to access markets when conditions permit	Increased access to locally produced/harvested food for vulnerable populations
N/A		More inclusive and environmentally sustainable legal, regulatory and learning framework for the extractive sector in South Sudan	The program would focus on building the capacity of the government to better manage oil production and exploration, when conditions permit	N/A
State institutions and Sudanese men, women, young males and females are better able to execute and actively participate in democratic processes and manage public resources	Effective and accountable use of public resources by state authorities; increased participation of civil society, including women, in democratic processes Effective and accountable use of public resources by state authorities; increased participation of civil society, including women, in democratic processes	More accountable and gender-responsive use of public funds by central agencies and sub-national governments and more democratic elections	The program will focus on supporting an inclusive reconciliation process, conditions for free and fair elections, and strengthening government accountability, when conditions permit	Strengthened democratic and oversight processes and institutions

¹⁸⁵ Sudan CDPF (2009-2014), Annex - A Logic Model, Sudan Country Program, xCIDA (EDRMS 4567400)

¹⁸⁶ Draft South Sudan Logic Model (2012), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 6246641)

¹⁸⁷ Draft South Sudan Investment Plan, South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 6632418)

¹⁸⁸ Draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

4.4 Non-Bilateral DFATD Programming

Partnership for Development Innovation Branch: DFATD’s support to Canadian civil society organisations draws on Canadian expertise and networks to address local needs. These projects also aim to strengthen the skills and abilities of local organisations. Previous partnership projects have focused on maternal, newborn and child health, and youth vocational training. Future programming will complement other DFATD programming, in line with the country context.

Global Issues and Development Branch: DFATD also provides considerable support to multilateral and global partners, particularly in the area of humanitarian assistance. The objectives of this support include access to food, shelter, safe drinking water and sanitation, emergency health care, and protection services for conflict and disaster affected populations. Canada also provides long-term institutional support to partners working in South Sudan, as well as innovative global initiatives.¹⁸⁹

4.5. START Strategic Objectives and Programming Priorities in South Sudan

Given the merger of xCIDA and xDFAIT into the new DFATD, and the critical links between security, stabilisation and development in conflict and fragile affected states, START interventions in South Sudan are integral to this evaluation and are therefore included in the evaluation sample.

The six programming priorities of START’s Sudan envelope, aligned with Canada’s whole-of-government objectives in Sudan¹⁹⁰, are outlined below:

Whole of Government Objectives in Sudan	START GPSF Programming Priorities (PR) in Sudan (2009-2013)
OBJ 1: Contain violence and enhance security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PR1: Increased effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan • PR2: A productive peace process in Darfur • PR3: Government of Southern Sudan, civil society and communities better able to address community-level security concerns
OBJ 2: Reduce vulnerability and save lives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PR4: Reduced loss of life amongst conflict-affected populations
OBJ 3: Build longer-term stability and resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PR5: Key CPA provisions implemented • PR6: North/South Sudan and transitional areas better able to peacefully address post-referenda arrangements

START-specific strategic objectives were not clearly demarcated in the GPSF Multi Year Strategic Framework for Sudan (2009-2013). However, they were outlined in Annual Reports over the evaluation period. Although there are slight differences in how the objectives were framed in the Annual Reports, a synthesis is provided below:

START GPSF Strategic Objectives in Sudan (2009/10 - 2011/12)

- 1) Increase effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan;
- 2) Support a productive peace process in Darfur;
- 3) Increase the capacity of the GRSS, civil society and communities to better address community-level security concerns;

¹⁸⁹ Draft Interim Bilateral Development Strategy for South Sudan (2014-2016), South Sudan Country Program, DFATD (EDRMS 7029487)

¹⁹⁰ The information in this section is drawn from START’s most recently approved program planning document, the *Global Peace and Security Fund Multi-Year Strategic Framework for Sudan* (including what was then the Autonomous Region of Southern Sudan) 2009-2013.

- 4) Reduce loss of life amongst conflict affected populations;
- 5) Implement key CPA provisions; and
- 6) Support Northern Sudan, Southern Sudan and the Transitional Areas efforts to peacefully address post-referenda arrangements.

The next table outlines the evolution of the *intermediate outcomes* for GPSF in Sudan and South Sudan over the evaluation period (2009/10 – 2013/14), drawing on Annual Reports and the Multi-Year Strategic Framework for Sudan (2011-2013). There are no formal program-level reporting documents available for FY2012/13 or FY2013/14 due to the uncertainty of START Program funding during those two years, as well as no formal updated planning documents since the GPSF Multi-Year Strategic Framework for Sudan (2009-2013).

Table 3: Evolution of Intermediate Outcomes for START - GPSF in Sudan (and South Sudan) from 2009 – 2013			
Annual Report 2009-2010	GPSF Multi-Year Strategic Framework for Sudan – Logic Model (2009-2013)	Annual Report 2010-2011¹⁹¹	Annual Report 2011-2012
Increase the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan	Increased operational readiness of UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan to fulfill their mandate	Increased operational readiness of UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan to fulfill their mandate	Increased operational readiness of UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan to fulfill their mandate
Contribute to a more productive peace process in Darfur	* original intermediate outcome shifted into immediate outcome #4 (3.1 in Logic Model)	* shifted into immediate outcome #4	* shifted into immediate outcome #6
Assist the GRSS, civil society and communities to address community-level security concerns	Enhanced effectiveness of stakeholders to address community level security concerns	Enhanced effectiveness of stakeholders to address community level security concerns	Enhanced effectiveness of stakeholders to address community level security concerns
Reduce the loss of life amongst conflict-affected populations	*original intermediate shifted into immediate outcome #3 (2.2 in Logic Model)	*shifted into immediate outcome #3	*shifted into immediate outcome #3
Support the implementation of key Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provisions	Increased agreement and compliance with peace agreements and framework arrangements	Increased agreement and compliance with peace agreements and framework arrangements	Increased agreement and compliance with peace agreements and framework arrangements
Assist North Sudan, Southern Sudan and the transitional areas to peacefully address post-referenda arrangements	*original intermediate outcome shifted into immediate outcome #6 (3.3 in Logic Model)	*shifted into immediate outcome #6	*shifted into immediate outcome #5

5. Investment Profile

¹⁹¹ Note: The *immediate* outcomes from the 2010/11 annual report mirrored the *intermediate outcomes* in the 2009/10 annual report:

- 1) strengthen the skills, knowledge and capacity of UNMIS and UNAMID to fulfill their mandates;
- 2) enhance skills, knowledge and capacity of state institutions, civil society and communities in addressing community-level security concerns in South and East Sudan;
- 3) reduce hazardous mine and explosive remnants of war threatens and increase skills, knowledge and capacity of domestic demining organisations to sustain activities;
- 4) increase ability of stakeholders involved in the Darfur peace process to build conditions for peace;
- 5) increase States Parties, UN, INGOS, and civil society's skills, knowledge and capacity to implement key CPA provisions; and
- 6) improve skills and knowledge of States Parties, and government of Transitional Areas to address post-referenda arrangements peacefully, with support for citizen-centered democratic practices.

5.1 Evaluation Universe

The xCIDA/DFATD (excluding START) funded a total of roughly **84 projects** in South Sudan from 2009/10 to 2013/14, with disbursements totalling roughly **\$231 million**.¹⁹² These initiatives were mostly disbursed via the Sub Saharan Africa Branch (WGM), and Global Issues and Development Branch (MFM), with a few initiatives delivered through the Partnership for Development Innovation Branch (KFM)¹⁹³:

- **WGM disbursed \$144.8 million (or 63%)** of total xCIDA/DFATD spending in South Sudan (through 34 investments)
- **MFM disbursed \$82.7 million (or 36%)** of total spending in South Sudan (through 46 investments)
- **KFM disbursed roughly \$3.9 million (or 2%)** of total spending in South Sudan (through 4 investments)

Given the nature and scope of resources, the evaluation will give priority to WGM's bilateral program, which represents over 60% of xCIDA/DFATD's disbursements in South Sudan. However, to ensure the sample is representative of all channels of cooperation, development initiatives supported by MFM and KFM that are substantive enough to make their inclusion in the evaluation cost-efficient will also be included.

Alongside these development investments, the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START), managed by the xDFAIT, implemented over 35 stabilization projects in Sudan and South Sudan from FY2009/10 to 2013/14. These interventions totaled roughly \$47 million (in disbursements) and were concentrated in the areas of: mine action, peacebuilding, policy and security forces (including airport security), mediation and peace processes, as well as justice.¹⁹⁴ A complete list of DFATD projects in South Sudan, as well as START projects in Sudan and South Sudan, undertaken during the evaluation period (2009-2010 to 2013-2014) can be found in Annexes 8 and 11 respectively.

5.2 Thematic Priorities

The largest area of xCIDA spending in South Sudan during the evaluation period was Children and Youth (including MNCH), representing (37%) of total program disbursements. The next largest areas were Food Security (26%), Humanitarian Assistance (non-food initiatives) (19%), and Sustainable Economic Growth (14%)¹⁹⁵. It should also be noted that roughly 5% of overall disbursements were given to a few "Other" areas, including Other-Advancing Democracy (3%), Other-Ensuring Security and Stability (2%) and Other-Not assigned to any Thematic Priority (less than 1%).

In terms of branch trends, for WGM the main areas of disbursements were Children and Youth (33% of total disbursements), Democratic Governance (29%), Sustainable Economic Growth (23%), and Food Security (15%). For KFM, Children and Youth (91%) was by far the predominant area, with the remainder of funds going to Sustainable Economic Growth (9%). In terms of MFM, over half of branch

¹⁹² These figures draw on data provided by CFOB that was updated in Spring/Fall 2014, as well as data from the Annual Country Reports of DFATD's South Sudan Country Program. Although the percentage of funding allocated to South Sudan (vs. Sudan) differed among these projects, over half allocated 50% or more of funds to South Sudan.

¹⁹³ Note: Following the creation of DFATD, Sub-Saharan Africa Branch (WGM) replaced the former Geographic Programs Branch (GPB); Global Issues and Development Branch (MFM) replaced the former Multilateral and Global Programs Branch (MGPB); and Partnership for Development Innovation (KFM) replaced the former Partnerships with Canadians Branch (PWCB).

¹⁹⁴ Figures obtained from xDFAIT – Sudan South Sudan 2009-2014 Consolidated Disbursements, as well as DFATD CFOB – South Sudan Statistical Profile 2009-10 to 2013-14.

¹⁹⁵ xCIDA conducted an evaluation of xCIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) in 2011, which included Sudan as a case study. However, the latter was focused on assessing the performance of xCIDA's IHA. In contrast, the proposed Country Program Evaluation of South Sudan will focus on coordination and coherence among DFATD investments along the continuum of humanitarian assistance, recovery and reconstruction. Furthermore, South Sudan became an independent state in 2011. Thus, international humanitarian assistance provided to the country from 2011-2013 was not included in xCIDA's IHA evaluation. Consequently, the CPE of South Sudan will include IHA to South Sudan over the evaluation period (2009/10 to 2013/14) in terms of coherence and coordination with bilateral and START programming, but draw on findings from xCIDA IHA evaluation report where relevant.

disbursements were channelled to Humanitarian Assistance (55%), while the rest were in Food Security (45%). All of MFM's Food Security disbursements were provided to WFP (\$24.6M). START projects, for their part, were concentrated in the following areas: mine action, peacebuilding, policy and security forces (including airport security), mediation and peace processes, as well as justice.¹⁹⁶

DFATD's (excluding START) top ten executing agencies/actors in South Sudan during this period (in terms of total spending) were: World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), World Health Organisation, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), UNDP Emergency Response Division, UK Department for International Development, Canadian Hunger Foundation, and the Government of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

START's top ten executing agencies/actors in Sudan and South Sudan during this period (in terms of total spending) were: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT), Forum of Federations, International Development Law Organisation (IDLO), Danish Demining Group (DDG), United Nations Habitat, Saferworld and Norwegian's People's Aid.¹⁹⁷

5.3 Delivery Modalities

The "responsive" delivery mode (as coded in DFATD's Agency Information System by the responsible project officers) was used for the majority (60 of 84) of investments and accounted for 87% of total disbursements (or roughly \$200 million). The "directive" delivery model was only used for 4 investments, accounting for just 1% of total disbursements (or \$1.75 million). There were also 2 'core funding' investments, roughly representing 1% of disbursements (or \$2.3 million). It should be noted that several projects (18) were coded as 'none' for the delivery channel. Consultations with the program should help to align these projects under other delivery channels, where possible.

5.4. Limitations

Given that the xCIDA's South Sudan Country Program is relatively new, there will be several sampling limitations. Access to full data over the evaluation period may be inconsistent, due to changing program priorities, directions and staffing for the new program. In addition, the evaluation methodology will need to take into account the potential of limited planning or reporting information for DFATD efforts in South Sudan from 2009-2011, given that the latter would have fallen under the larger Sudan Country Program during this period. Finally, access to data and respondents in the field may also be difficult, depending on the security conditions in South Sudan at the time of the evaluation. These risk factors (and mitigation measures) are addressed in a scenario and risks document (see EDRMS 7117402; 7138577) developed for this CPE.

6. Evaluation Issues


Designing an evaluation for the South Sudan Country Program will be both complicated and challenging, given the country's socio-economic, political and development context. There has not been a recent overall evaluation of the South Sudan Country Program, nor START projects in South Sudan, given the country's relatively new independence.¹⁹⁸ While performing the evaluation, the Consultant will consider

¹⁹⁶ Sudan South Sudan 2009-2014 Consolidated Disbursements, START Program, DFATD.

¹⁹⁷ Sudan South Sudan 2009-2014 Consolidated Disbursements, START Program, DFATD.

¹⁹⁸ A partial exception is xCIDA's IHA evaluation, which covered Sudan as a case study.

the following factors that at some point may have impacted the implementation programming in South Sudan, or will affect future programming.¹⁹⁹ These factors include, but are not limited to, the following:



The evaluation issues have been reviewed in consultation with the South Sudan team, the Head of Cooperation, the Advisory Committee, and the Development Evaluation Division during the planning phase for this evaluation, and these issues will then be reflected in the Evaluation Work Plan.

The questions in the table below reflect the issues of priority for the key stakeholders, a number of which are retrospective while others are prospective. The retrospective questions address largely accountability issues, as well as some learning issues. The prospective questions (represented mostly by the sub-questions) address learning issues for DFATD staff and key stakeholders to support the development of the next Country Development Strategy (2016 – 2021), future programming options for START, as well as Canada’s Whole of Government approach in South Sudan going forward. The following are the evaluation criteria and related questions that should be considered for the purposes of this evaluation:

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS
RELEVANCE	
<p>1. To what extent have Canada’s policy and program interventions responded to the needs of the population in South Sudan?</p>	<p>1.1 Are the South Sudan Country Program, and START, intervening in the areas where they can make a difference, given Canada’s comparative advantage among other donors?</p> <p>1.2 Among the international donor efforts in South Sudan, did Canada have a recognized value added; if so what was it?</p> <p>1.3 To what extent have country needs and context been taken into account by the South Sudan Country Program and START in designing current and future programming? In particular, have the differentiated needs of the population, and in particular of marginalized and vulnerable groups, such as women and girls, been taken into account?</p> <p>1.4 Are recommendations of the Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict prevention and Peace building Activities in Southern Sudan (2005 – 2010) still valid for future programming?</p>
<p>2. To what extent were the South Sudan Country Program and START, aligned with Canadian priorities?</p>	<p>2.1 To what extent were funding decisions based on the South Sudan Country Development Program Framework, and Global Peace and Security Fund’s (GPSF) Multi Year Strategic Framework (START)? Were these investments and policy dialogue efforts consistent with DFATD policies and priorities?</p>

¹⁹⁹ Note – these issues were raised and discussed with staff involved in South Sudan development programming.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS
	<p>2.2 Are currently planned investments and policy dialogue efforts likely to enable the achievement of the expected results of the South Sudan Program Country Strategy, and GPSF Multi Year Strategic Framework (START) in South Sudan?</p> <p>2.3. Were the South Sudan Country Program and START, well aligned with the Whole-of-Government framework in place? What was the impact of this framework on the South Sudan Country Program, and START?</p>
EFFECTIVENESS	
<p>3. To what extent did Canada achieve its expected results in South Sudan?</p>	<p>3.1 Are there documented examples of stability /poverty reduction outcomes across sectors? Were any unintended positive or negative results produced?</p> <p>3.2 Are the theories of change for the South Sudan Country Program and START in South Sudan sound, and based on valid assumptions? Are there alternative, more appropriate theories of change?</p> <p>3.3 Does the current provision of stabilization/reconstruction/development assistance have an influence on state-building processes? Alternatives?</p> <p>3.4 Have interventions in addressing cross-cutting themes of gender equality, environmental sustainability and governance through policy dialogue efforts and project investments had an impact, intended or unintended?</p> <p>3.5 Was the selection of delivery modalities and partners appropriate relative to country context? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each delivery modality, including cost comparison, for South Sudan?</p> <p>3.6 Are current approaches, methods and metrics for designing and managing investments, particularly in the development areas of Food Security, Children and Youth (including MNCH), Advancing Democracy and Sustainable Economic Growth as well as stabilisation, appropriate given the country context? What are the priorities and/or are there alternatives to consider for future programming?</p> <p>3.7 Is the approach to capacity building compatible with the country context? Options to consider for future programming?</p>

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS
<p>4. To what extent was programming in South Sudan consistent with the OECD principles and best practices for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States²⁰⁰?</p>	<p>4.1 Based on past experience and the current context in South Sudan, was the selection of investments and partners the most effective to achieve results? Alternatives to consider for future programming?</p> <p>4.2 Were the criteria used to choose interventions relevant, to ensure that these interventions maximized relevance, effectiveness and value for money? Alternative criteria to consider?</p> <p>4.3. What role has Canada played in facilitating donor coordination and in mitigating the risks of program duplication and extensive reporting demands?</p> <p>4.4 Is there a policy dialogue strategy, including results it wants to achieve? Is there an alternative approach that would be more effective?</p> <p>4.5 Are there examples of policy dialogue efforts that led to change within government and/or other partners, including establishment of formal or informal networks, strengthening of partnerships?</p>
<p>5. To what extent were the South Sudan Country Program, and START, interventions in South Sudan coordinated with other DFATD delivery channels (Global Issues and Development Branch, and Partnerships with Canadians Branch)?</p>	<p>5.1 To what extent was there dialogue, collaboration, and coordination among DFATD’s development, humanitarian and stabilisation efforts in South Sudan?</p> <p>5.2 Are there examples of dialogue, collaboration and coordination among DFATD’s development, humanitarian and stabilisation efforts that led to changes in DFATD priorities, programming and/or operations?</p> <p>5.3 Are lessons identified and incorporated into decision-making processes?</p>
EFFICIENCY	
<p>6. Were human and financial resources used appropriately for the outcomes achieved so far, in light of context, priorities and potential alternatives?</p>	<p>6.1 Did formal program documentation from the South Sudan Country Program and START, as well as informal guidance from senior management, give clear direction to the investment portfolio?</p> <p>6.2 Was the time needed for project and disbursement approvals appropriate?</p> <p>6.3 Are current tools and processes²⁰¹ appropriate for undertaking and monitoring programming in South Sudan? Are there alternatives?</p> <p>6.4 Have appropriate ways of dealing with risk that are based on</p>

²⁰⁰ See, for example, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Publication Series: Conflict and Fragility*, <http://oecd.org/dac/publicationsseriesconflictandfragility.htm> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

See also New Deal: Building Peaceful States, last modified in 2015, <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

See also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Aid Effectiveness - Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action*, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

²⁰¹ See MODUS - Country Program Planning / Planification des programmes géographiques or can be found in the folder 6946577 (both E&F). In particular see the Reference Documents in the following EDRMS folder # 6967860 and a key document developed for Fragile and Conflict Affected States as part of Step 2 (Analysis and Documentation) # [SGDE-EDRMS-#6947927-STEP 2 - CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT REVIEW \(GUIDANCE\)](#) and # [SGDE-EDRMS-#6958303-STEP 2 - CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT REVIEW \(TEMPLATE\)](#). A separate guidance entitled *Conflict Analysis and Fragility Assessment Review* (EDRMS 6947927 / SGDE 6964197) is a tool in support of reviewing key elements for these countries. Also, [SGDE-EDRMS-#6078931-GPB RBM - GUIDANCE ON HOW TO APPLY RBM IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT AFFECTED STATES \(MASTER COPY\)](#)

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS
	<p>OECD best practices been identified?</p> <p>6.5 Were timely corrective actions taken to resolve identified problems or modify the course of investments?</p>
SUSTAINABILITY	
<p>7. What steps have been taken to create long term processes, structures, norms and institutions for peace and development in South Sudan?</p>	<p>7.1 Did development and START programming address the causes and drivers of conflict and fragility? What would be the best practices?</p> <p>7.2 Were conditions created to implement more complex initiatives that tackle the causes of conflict? What are the best options for the donor community?</p> <p>7.3 To what extent is sustainability compromised by the recurrence of conflict? What can be reasonably envisioned in terms of sustainability considering the actual level of peace and development?</p>

Annex 1 – South Sudan Country Statistics

South Sudan	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sub-Saharan Africa 2012	Haiti 2012	Afghanistan 2012	West Bank & Gaza 2012
Geography										
Surface area	thousand sq. km	n/a	n/a	644.33	644.33	644.33	24,290	28	652	6
Population										
Population, ages 15-64	in thousands	5,096	5,344	5,606	5,880	6,146	490,274	6,119	15,004	122
Population growth	%	4.32	4.32	4.33	4.30	4.14	2.71	1.39	2.44	3.01
Urban population	% of total population	17.72	17.86	18.05	18.25	18.45	36.81	54.64	23.86	74.57
Economic development										
GNI, Atlas method	current USD in millions	n/a	10,773.0	14,101.7	9,051.5	12,673.7	1,431,289	7,761	20,455	11,392
GNI per capita, Atlas method	current USD	n/a	1080	1360	840	1120	1,569	760	690	2810
GNI per capita, PPP	current international \$	2,970	2,600	3,200	1,750	2,190	3,124	1640	1940	4900
GDP growth	%	7.02	3.12	2.63	-48.98	24.40	4.24	2.89	14.43	13.84
GDP per capita growth	%	2.50	-1.24	-1.72	-51.13	19.35	1.49	1.46	11.68	10.47
% of Population below poverty line ²⁰²	% of population	50.6	51.0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	58.7	35.8	25.8
Life expectancy at birth, total	years	52.91	53.47	54.05	54.64	n/a	56.44	62.70	60.51	73.02
Infant mortality rate	per 1,000 live births	73.6	71.2	68.8	66.7	n/a	63.98	56.50	71.00	19.20
Child malnutrition	% of children under 5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	11.60	n/a	n/a
Education										
Adult literacy, male	% of ages 15 and older	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	68.12 (2010)	n/a	45.42 (2011)	98.19
Adult literacy, female	% of ages 15 and older	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	51.02 (2010)	n/a	17.61 (2011)	93.58
Gross primary enrollment, male	% of population of official age group	n/a	n/a	102.94	n/a	n/a	104.50	n/a	120.56	95.06
Gross primary enrollment, female	% of population of official age group	n/a	n/a	68.15	n/a	n/a	96.25	n/a	86.57	93.65
Access to resources										
Access to an improved water source	% of population	n/a	69.00*	56.50	n/a	n/a	64.44	62.40	64.20	81.80
Access to improved sanitation facilities	% of population	n/a	n/a	8.90	n/a	n/a	29.58	24.40	29.00	94.30

* = from DFATD, South Sudan Facts at a Glance

<http://www.acdi-xCIDA.gc.ca/acdi-xCIDA/acdi-xCIDA.nsf/En/JUD-222122022-NCA>

Unless otherwise indicated, source: World Bank World Development Indicators

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx> (queried for South Sudan, 2009-2013) accessed website on August 15, 2014

²⁰² Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook – South Sudan," data estimated from 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html> (Retrieved February 18, 2015)

Data estimates from "Poverty in Southern Sudan: Estimates from National Baseline Household Survey" (2010), quoted in Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE), *Key Indicators for Southern Sudan*, p.10.

Annex 2 – DFATD’s Top 50 Executing Agencies with Disbursements to South Sudan by Fiscal Year for 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD millions)

Executing agency	# of proj	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	Total disbursements from 2009/10 to 2013-2014
WFP - World Food Programme	24			11,275,300.00	18,727,834.13	18,271,643.00	48,274,777.13
UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund	4			7,000,000.00	9,812,735.00	4,701,970.00	21,514,705.00
UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund	24	4,000,500.00	3,500,000.00	3,500,000.00	1,553,080.00	6,000,000.00	18,553,580.00
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	7		8,335,694.00	3,510,508.00	3,528,798.00		15,375,000.00
WHO - World Health Organization	1		4,000,000.00	4,000,000.00	6,000,000.00		14,000,000.00
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	6			2,000,570.00	7,500,125.00	3,000,250.00	12,500,945.00
UNDP Emergency Response Division	1	4,011,000.00	5,989,000.00				10,000,000.00
UK Department for International Development	3				8,393,000.00	1,000,000.00	9,393,000.00
CHF	6	1,198,149.00	3,319,094.00	2,560,027.00	848,078.00	1,121,982.00	9,047,330.00
Government of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1	1,542,750.00		3,457,250.00	1,000,000.00	1,500,000.00	7,500,000.00
World Relief Canada	7	1,144,007.00	1,404,242.00	1,758,902.00	1,232,068.00	1,500,000.00	7,039,219.00
CARE Canada	10	1,201,131.12	930,440.00	1,299,613.12	3,066,104.00		6,497,288.24
World Vision Canada	4	1,000,000.00	909,139.00	2,353,302.00	406,559.00	1,350,000.00	6,019,000.00
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme	3		4,929,764.00				4,929,764.00
Int'l Organization for Migration	4				2,500,110.00	2,000,080.00	4,500,190.00
Canadian Red Cross Society	17		131,924.03	890,961.37	861,718.51	2,197,611.20	4,082,215.11
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross	6				1,539,000.00	2,475,000.00	4,014,000.00
Médecins sans frontières/ Doctors without Borders	3		1,000,000.00		1,200,000.00	1,000,000.00	3,200,000.00
World University Service of Canada	4	100,185.00	429,732.00	1,206,423.00	862,179.00	312,989.00	2,911,508.00
Population Services International	2				2,676,029.00	140,844.00	2,816,873.00

Executing agency	# of proj	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	Total disbursements from 2009/10 to 2013-2014
Government of the Netherlands - Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2	574,352.58	913,996.33	450,000.00	434,246.86	411,963.06	2,784,558.83
Save the Children Canada	2		1,000,000.00		1,500,000.00		2,500,000.00
University of Calgary Financial Services	3	186,625.00	881,432.00	895,781.00	296,442.00		2,260,280.00
OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	3			499,200.00	1,000,000.00	499,950.00	1,999,150.00
Veterinarians without Borders/ Vétérinaires sans Frontières	1					1,400,000.00	1,400,000.00
South Africa National Treasury IDC	2	134,126.20	292,401.60	77,926.62	677,372.50	202,422.70	1,384,249.62
Carter Center	1		1,324,822.10	31,839.50			1,356,661.60
Plan International Canada Inc. (Plan Canada)	2	908,909.28	341,066.88	65,189.07			1,315,165.23
African Medical and Research Foundation	5	288,360.38	286,619.70	274,387.70	159,703.44		1,009,071.22
War Child Canada	3				305,042.46	654,439.00	959,481.46
TradeMark East Africa	2					600,000.00	600,000.00
Oxfam Canada	1			500,000.00			500,000.00
World Bank	3		100,000.00	200,000.00	130,000.00		430,000.00
Chakam School of the Bible Inc.	1	145,859.08	160,120.65	36,166.00	14,982.00		357,127.73
Ambassade du Canada à Khartoum	2		92,067.50	95,010.48			187,077.98
International Development Research Centre	2					166,500.00	166,500.00
International HIV/AIDS Alliance	1			67,200.00			67,200.00
High Commission of Canada to Kenya	1					54,078.85	54,078.85
Thurairatnam, Anna	1				39,366.43	5,056.23	44,422.66
Grand Total	175	16,435,954.64	40,271,555.79	48,005,556.86	76,264,573.33	50,566,779.04	231,544,419.66

Source: CFO stats, data as of 2014-07-10.

Annex 3 – DFATD Disbursements to South Sudan by Branch and Fiscal Year for 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD)

Branch	# proj	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	Total \$	Total %	Avg/Proj
Partnership for Development Innovation	4	145,859.08	160,120.65	795,966.00	1,033,625.46	1,776,421.00	3,911,992.19	2%	977,998.05
Global Issues and Development	46		2,000,000.00	16,275,070.00	27,506,149.13	37,015,243.00	82,796,462.13	36%	1,799,923.09
Sub-Saharan Africa	34	16,290,095.56	38,111,435.14	30,934,520.86	47,724,798.74	11,775,115.04	144,835,965.34	63%	4,259,881.33
Grand Total	84	16,435,954.64	40,271,555.79	48,005,556.86	76,264,573.33	50,566,779.04	231,544,419.66	100%	2,756,481.19

Source: CFO-Stats, data as of 2014-06-13

Annex 4 – DFATD Disbursements to South Sudan by Delivery Model and Fiscal Year for 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD)

Delivery model	# proj	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	Total \$	Total %	Avg/Proj
CORE	2	288,360.38	286,619.70	724,387.70	593,950.30	411,963.06	2,305,281.14	1%	1,152,640.57
DIRE	4	574,352.58	913,996.33		39,366.43	225,635.08	1,753,350.42	1%	438,337.61
none	18	-	-	-	99,000.00	26,676,100.00	26,775,100.00	12%	1,487,505.56
RESP	60	15,573,241.68	39,070,939.76	47,281,169.16	75,532,256.60	23,253,080.90	200,710,688.10	87%	3,345,178.14
Grand Total	84	16,435,954.64	40,271,555.79	48,005,556.86	76,264,573.33	50,566,779.04	231,544,419.66	100%	2,756,481.19

Source: Source: CFO stats, data as of 2014-07-10.

Annex 5 – DFATD Disbursements to South Sudan by Investment Type and Fiscal Year for 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD)

Investment type	# proj	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	Total \$	Total %	Avg/Proj
Canada Funds	2	-	92,067.50	95,010.48	-	-	187,077.98	0%	93,538.99
Non PBA (Program-based approaches)	18				99,000.00	26,676,100.00	26,775,100.00	12%	1,487,505.56
Program-based approaches	4	708,478.78	1,206,397.93	527,926.62	9,504,619.36	1,614,385.76	13,561,808.45	6%	3,390,452.11
Programs	3	288,360.38	286,619.70	7,341,587.70	4,322,438.44	2,890,084.00	15,129,090.22	7%	5,043,030.07
Projects	57	15,439,115.48	38,686,470.66	40,041,032.06	62,338,515.53	19,386,209.28	175,891,343.01	76%	3,085,813.04
Grand Total	84	16,435,954.64	40,271,555.79	48,005,556.86	76,264,573.33	50,566,779.04	231,544,419.66	100%	2,756,481.19

Source: CFO stats, data as of 2014-07-10.

Annex 6 – DFATD Disbursements to South Sudan by Thematic Priority and Fiscal Year for 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD)

Principal thematic priority	# proj	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	Total \$	Total %	Avg-Proj
Children and Youth	24	7,628,586.66	11,852,231.58	20,763,784.77	31,480,805.33	14,603,780.23	86,329,188.57	37%	3,597,049.52
Food Security	11	2,068,289.12	10,342,659.03	16,308,588.49	12,797,674.64	17,617,434.20	59,134,645.48	26%	5,375,876.86
Sustainable Economic Growth	8	6,408,087.86	7,355,518.58	4,021,342.62	12,126,601.36	2,714,385.76	32,625,936.18	14%	4,078,242.02
Other - Advancing Democracy	2		6,254,586.10	31,839.50			6,286,425.60	3%	3,143,212.80
Other - Ensuring Security and Stability	1	330,991.00	2,374,493.00	1,084,921.00	134,477.00		3,924,882.00	2%	3,924,882.00
Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid	35		2,000,000.00	5,700,070.00	19,725,015.00	15,577,100.00	43,002,185.00	19%	1,228,633.86
Other - Not assigned to any Thematic Priorities	3		92,067.50	95,010.48		54,078.85	241,156.83	0%	80,385.61
Grand Total	84	16,435,954.64	40,271,555.79	48,005,556.86	76,264,573.33	50,566,779.04	231,544,419.66	100%	2,756,481.19

Source: CFO stats, data as of 2014-07-10.

Annex 7 – DFATD Disbursements to South Sudan by Thematic Priority and Branch and Fiscal Year for 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD)

Thematic Priority	Geographic Program Branch		Multilateral and Global Programs Branch		Partnerships with Canadians	
	\$	% of total	\$	% of total	\$	% of total
Children and Youth	77,554,744.11	33	5,219,580.00	2.2	3,554,864.86	1.5
Sustainable Economic Growth	32,268,808.45	13			357,127.73	0.1
Food Security	24,559,948.35	10	34,574,697.13	14		
Other - Democratic Governance	6,286,425.6	2.7				
Other - Humanitarian Assistance			43,002,185.00	18		
Other – Ensuring Security	3,924,882.00	1.6				
Other – Not Assigned	241,156.83	0.1				
Grand Total	144,835,965.34		82,796,462.13		3,911,992.19	

Source: CFO stats, data as of 2014-07-10.

Annex 8– DFATD Projects in South Sudan from 2009-2010 to 2013-2014 (CAD)

* note – projects highlighted in blue began prior to the independence of South Sudan in July, 2011. Consequently, the project began operating in the Autonomous Region of Southern Sudan, but would later be operating in South Sudan as of July, 2011.


Project Name	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Project Status	Investment Type	% allocation to South Sudan	Project Total Budget	Project Total Disbursement	Principal thematic priority
A Better Future for Vulnerable Youth	2011-03-31	2016-10-31	Operational	Projects	100%	1,699,614.46	1,015,106.47	Children and Youth
CHF - Maternal & Child Health Enhancement	2011-01-31	2015-05-31	Operational	Projects	100%	3,749,993.00	2,626,801.00	Children and Youth
Chakam - Tech Training Returning Refugee	2009-12-01	2012-11-30	Closed	Projects	100%	357,127.73	357,127.73	Sustainable Economic Growth
Emerg. Nutrition in S. Sudan - SCC 2011	2011-03-11	2012-03-31	Closed	Projects	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emerg Medical Support in Sudan- MSF 2011	2011-03-10	2012-03-31	Closed	Projects	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
South Sudan - Oxfam Canada Project 2011	2011-06-08	2012-06-29	Closed	Projects	100%	500,000.00	500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
South Sudan Joint Donor Team	2007-04-02	2011-12-30	Closed	PBAs	100%	4,769,218.79	4,769,218.79	Sustainable Economic Growth
Mine Action and Development	2007-07-05	2011-03-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	4,924,882.00	4,893,507.00	Other - Ensuring Security and Stability
Peace & Livelihoods for Women in S Sudan	2008-08-08	2011-11-15	Closed	Projects	100%	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	Food Security
Recovery and Reintegration E&S Sudan	2008-03-19	2011-08-31	Closed	Projects	48%	4,055,810.56	4,055,810.56	Children and Youth
CFLI - FCIL Sudan 2010-2011	2008-04-01	2013-03-31	Closed	Canada Funds	50%	184,135.00	165,562.16	Other - Not assigned to any Thematic Priorities
CFLI - FCIL Sudan 2011-2012	2008-04-01	2013-03-31	Closed	Canada Funds	50%	190,020.96	190,020.96	Other - Not assigned to any Thematic Priorities
Basic Service Provision and Recovery	2009-07-13	2012-09-30	Closed	Projects	100%	4,539,219.00	4,539,219.00	Children and Youth
Sudanese Physician Reintegration Program	2008-12-01	2013-03-28	Closed	Projects	100%	3,099,004.00	3,099,004.00	Children and Youth
Promoting Integration in the Upper Nile	2009-08-18	2012-12-31	Closed	Projects	100%	4,110,288.24	4,110,288.24	Food Security
Capacity Building Trust Fund, Phase II	2008-12-01	2011-03-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	7,500,000.00	7,500,000.00	Sustainable Economic Growth
Sustainable Future for All //Education	2010-03-04	2013-07-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	3,100,000.00	2,911,508.00	Children and Youth
Tonj East Basic Services Project	2009-07-31	2013-02-28	Closed	Projects	100%	3,320,000.00	3,320,000.00	Children and Youth
Protection of Children	2010-03-31	2010-08-30	Terminating	Projects	27%	15,000,000.00	15,000,000.00	Children and Youth
Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative Proj	2009-11-18	2012-03-30	Closed	Projects	100%	10,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	Sustainable Economic Growth
Support for 2011 Referendum	2010-09-13	2012-01-30	Terminating	Projects	70%	7,042,520.00	7,042,520.00	Other - Advancing Democracy
Referendum Observation	2010-09-13	2012-01-30	Terminating	Projects	70%	1,932,716.00	1,932,716.00	Other - Advancing Democracy
Food Security South Sudan	2011-03-21	2014-03-31	Operational	Projects	100%	15,375,000.00	15,375,000.00	Food Security
YouthLEAD	2011-03-21	2013-08-30	Operational	Projects	50%	20,000,000.00	20,000,000.00	Children and Youth
South Sudan Joint Donor Team Phase II	2010-08-02	2013-03-29	Operational	PBAs	100%	3,000,000.00	1,296,209.92	Sustainable Economic Growth
Building Community Resilience	2011-03-22	2014-06-30	Operational	Projects	75%	5,140,387.06	4,415,919.52	Food Security
Emergency Obstetrics in South Sudan	2011-03-21	2016-09-29	Operational	Projects	100%	19,400,000.00	17,400,000.00	Children and Youth
Monitoring & Evaluation	2011-03-21	2016-09-29	Operational	Projects	100%	200,000.00	44,422.66	Children and Youth
African Medical Research Found 2007/12	2007-05-31	2013-06-30	Operational	Programs	10%	15,199,395.06	15,019,395.06	Children and Youth
Regional Public Sector Training	2007-08-31	2012-08-31	Operational	PBAs	20%	8,992,720.00	8,745,860.02	Sustainable Economic Growth
Learning on Gender and Conflict in Africa	2011-03-15	2014-03-31	Closed	Projects	10%	4,300,000.00	4,300,000.00	Children and Youth
IHAA/Delivering Maternal & Child Health	2012-03-22	2013-03-31	Closed	Programs	7%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Children and Youth
Catalyzing Change for Maternal, Newborn	2013-01-31	2019-03-29	Operational	Projects	11%	12,000,000.00	1,500,000.00	Children and Youth
S. Sudan Crisis - WFP Emerg. Appeal 2014	2014-01-23	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Food Security
WFP 2012 - The Sudans	2012-02-01	2013-06-28	Terminating	Projects	47%	22,500,000.00	22,500,000.00	Food Security
Emergency Food Asst. in Africa -WFP 2013	2013-01-10	2013-12-31	Terminating	Projects	11%	63,652,356.96	63,652,356.96	Food Security
Emergency Food Aid in Africa - WFP 2013	2013-01-10	2013-12-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	4,272,643.00	4,272,643.00	Food Security
WFP - Africa Country-Level 2014	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	15%	66,000,000.00	66,000,000.00	Food Security
Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS)	2013-01-30	1900-01-02	Terminating	Non PBA	11%	900,000.00	900,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
South Sudan - WFP Emergency Appeal 2013	2013-10-25	1900-01-02	Terminating	Non PBA	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Food Security

S. Sudan Crisis - WFP UNHAS 2014	2014-01-27	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	500,000.00	500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
S. Sudan Crisis - UNHCR Appeal 2014	2014-01-27	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
S. Sudan Crisis - ICRC Emrg. Appeal 2014	2014-01-27	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
South Sudan - CRCS Project 2011	2011-07-06	2012-06-29	Closed	Projects	100%	750,000.00	277,933.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
South Sudan - World Vision Canada 2011	2011-07-05	2012-09-30	Closed	Projects	100%	1,250,000.00	1,250,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
OCHA Country specific funding 2012	2012-03-29	2012-12-31	Terminating	Projects	42%	1,200,000.00	1,200,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
UNHCR Country Specific Funding 2012	2012-03-29	2012-12-31	Terminating	Projects	14%	14,300,000.00	14,300,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emerg. Nutrition - S. Sudan - SCC 2012	2012-04-27	2013-04-30	Terminating	Projects	100%	1,500,000.00	1,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emerg. Medical - S. Sudan - MSF 2012	2012-04-24	2013-03-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	1,200,000.00	1,200,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Humanitarian Air Services-WFP UNHAS 2012	2012-03-23	2012-12-31	Terminating	Projects	15%	4,700,000.00	4,700,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emerg. WASH - S. Sudan - CARE 2012	2012-05-01	2013-03-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	1,387,000.00	1,387,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
S. Sudan- IOM Emergency Appeal 2012	2012-09-13	2013-08-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	1,500,000.00	1,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
S. Sudan - UNHCR Emergency Appeal 2012	2012-09-04	2013-08-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	2,500,000.00	2,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emergency Airdrop in S. Sudan - WFP 2012	2012-09-04	2013-08-31	Terminating	Projects	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Food Security
WFP - UNHAS 2013	2013-01-02	2014-06-30	Terminating	Projects	26%	3,800,000.00	3,800,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
UNHCR- Country Specific Funding 2013	2013-01-15	2013-12-31	Terminating	Projects	24%	21,250,000.00	21,250,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
ICRC - Country Specific Funding 2013	2013-01-15	2013-12-31	Terminating	Projects	9%	17,100,000.00	17,100,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
IOM - Country Specific Funding 2013	2013-01-15	2013-12-31	Terminating	Projects	27%	3,700,000.00	3,700,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
OCHA Country Operations 2013-S. Sudan	2013-01-25	2014-06-30	Closed	Projects	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emerg. WASH - S. Sudan - WRC 2013	2013-03-29	2014-03-29	Terminating	Projects	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Emerg. Livelihoods - S.Sudan - VWB 2013	2013-03-29	2014-03-29	Operational	Projects	100%	1,400,000.00	1,400,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
CAP 2013 - Emerg. Health- S. Sudan- CARE	2013-03-29	2014-03-29	Operational	Projects	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
CRC - Africa Capacity Building	2013-10-10	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	25%	9,900,000.00	1,407,280.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
S. Sudan Crisis - IOM Emrg. Appeal 2014	2014-01-27	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	3,500,000.00	3,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Africa South Sudan - MSF	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	1,000,000.00	1,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
South Sudan - Emerg. WASH - WRC 2014	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	1,500,000.00	1,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Africa South Sudan - World Vision Canada	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	1,350,000.00	1,350,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
ICRC 2014 Country-level Programming	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	5%	29,500,000.00	29,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Country-Level Programming - IOM	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	18%	2,800,000.00	2,800,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Country-Level Programming - OCHA	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	30%	1,650,000.00	1,650,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Country-Level Programming - UNHCR	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	9%	22,500,000.00	22,500,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
WFP - UNHAS 2014	2014-01-29	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	30%	5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00	Other - Humanitarian Assistance excluding emergency food aid
Support to UNICEF Child Survival Forum	2012-05-14	2013-03-28	Closed	Projects	10%	100,000.00	100,000.00	Children and Youth
UNICEF ICCM Stocktaking	2013-03-01	2015-03-31	Operational	Projects	7%	600,000.00	600,000.00	Children and Youth
Birth Registration for Maternal, Newborn	2013-03-28	2017-03-31	Operational	Projects	25%	20,000,000.00	20,000,000.00	Children and Youth
Training midwives in South Sudan	2011-07-21	2016-12-31	Operational	Programs	100%	19,484,700.00	14,052,819.00	Children and Youth
Emergency Obstetrics in South Sudan	2011-07-21	2015-01-31	Operational	PBAs	100%	19,400,000.00	19,400,000.00	Children and Youth
MNCH Monitoring, Research in South Sudan	2011-07-21	2016-03-31	Operational	Projects	100%	3,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	Children and Youth
PSU Services for South Sudan	2012-04-02	2013-12-31	Operational	Projects	100%	500,000.00	54,078.85	Other - Not assigned to any Thematic Priorities
ICCM in South Sudan	2012-05-15	2013-03-28	Closed	Projects	100%	2,816,873.00	2,816,873.00	Children and Youth
Deploying Midwives to South Sudan	2013-01-01	2016-12-31	Operational	Projects	100%	10,600,000.00	4,461,886.00	Children and Youth
WFP Food for Assests - South Sudan	2013-02-01	2018-02-01	Operational	Projects	100%	20,000,000.00	20,000,000.00	Sustainable Economic Growth
Improving MNC Survival in Warrap State	2013-02-27	1900-01-02	Operational	Non PBA	100%	19,997,000.00	500,000.00	Children and Youth
TMEA - Integrated Border Management	2013-04-01	2017-03-31	Operational	Projects	10%	12,200,000.00	6,000,000.00	Sustainable Economic Growth

Source: CFO stats, data as of 2014-07-10.

Annex 9 - Sudan Country Program Logic Model (2010-2015)

Title	Sudan Program	Cost Centre	4232	Team Leader	Christina Green and Stephen Salewicz
Country/Region	Sudan/Southern and Eastern Africa	Budget	\$100 million (FY 2010)	Duration	FYs 2010–2015



ACTIVITIES

<p>Food distribution and general support to IDPs, refugees and other crisis-affected populations (WFP, UNHCR, ICRC).</p> <p>This set of activities is funded and implemented by the International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) directorate of the Multilateral and Global Programs Branch. This funding is included in the total budget noted above.</p>	<p><i>Operational:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coastal livelihoods project • SPELS • Promoting Reintegration of Returnees • Mine Risk Education • Mine Action and Development • MDTF <p><i>Planned:</i> REAL; Sustainable Food Security Through Community Based Livelihoods in South Sudan; Sustainable Food Security Through Community Based Livelihoods in South Kordofan</p>	<p><i>Operational:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coastal livelihoods project • SPELS • Mine Risk Education • Mine Action and Development • MDTF <p><i>Planned:</i> REAL; Sustainable Food Security Through Community Based Livelihoods in South Sudan; Sustainable Food Security Through Community Based Livelihoods in South Kordofan</p>	<p><i>Operational:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education for Conflict Affected Child • Protective environment for Darfur children • Basic Services Provision and Recovery • Sudanese Physician Reintegration • MDTF • East and South Recovery & Reintegration • BSF • Victim assistance • Tonj East Basic Services <p><i>Planned:</i> Protection of CAAFG and Other Conflict-affected Children; Building a Sustainable Future through Education</p>	<p><i>Operational:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protective environment for Darfur children • Sudanese Physician Reintegration • MDTF • East and South Recovery & Reintegration • Basic Services Fund • Tonj East Basic Services <p><i>Planned:</i> Protection of CAAFG and Other Conflict-affected Children; Building a Sustainable Future through Education</p>	<p><i>Operational:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSAF • South Sudan Joint Donor Team • MDTF • Strengthening Sudanese Parliament • Conflict Prevention Horn of Africa • Democratic Governance <p><i>Planned:</i> Referendum Basket-Fund ; Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative</p>	<p><i>Operational:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peacebuilding and Reconciliation • PALAMA • South Sudan Joint Donor Team • Democratic Governance • Strengthening Sudanese Parliament • MDTF <p><i>Planned:</i> CBTF; Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative</p>
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Annex 10 – Sudan Country Program Performance Measurement Framework (2009/10-2014/15)

Title	Sudan Program Performance Measurement Framework	No.		Program Manager	David Ross/Stephen Salewicz
Country/Region/ Institution	Sudan	Budget	\$100 million/year	Duration	2009/10 to 2014/2015

EXPECTED RESULTS	INDICATORS ²⁰³	BASELINE DATA	TARGETS	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION METHODS	FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBILITY
<p>ULTIMATE OUTCOME Increased stability and longer term sustainable economic prosperity and social well being for Sudanese men, women, girls and boys.</p>	<p>Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)²⁰⁴ a. # of CPA milestones met b. Degree of violence (i.e. trend lines for deadly incidents reported) Other c. Degree to which humanitarian assistance is needed (i.e. trend lines for \$ value of appeals) d. Human Development Index e. % of population living on less than \$US 1.25/day?</p>	<p>a. Elections, referendum, DDR, border demarcation outstanding b. On-going violence in Darfur, recent escalation in South Sudan c. Value of total HA provided to Sudan (2006) = \$US 1.45 B d. 0.531 (2006). e. National: 50% population below the poverty line; South: 90% population below the poverty line (2006).</p>	<p>a. All CPA milestones met by 2011 b. No large-scale incidents of violence (1,000 deaths or more). c. decrease in humanitarian assistance appeals d. Improvement from current ranking e. Reduction in total and Southern population living below the poverty line</p>	<p>WoG/field reporting; media; HDI</p>	<p>Routine data collection and document review</p>	<p>Annually</p>	<p>Sudan Analyst Team</p>
<p>INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES 1. Decreased morbidity and mortality among crisis-affected male and female populations.</p>	<p>KPIs a. Morbidity and mortality rates disaggregated by sex and age b. % of IDPs and refugees suffering from malnutrition or under fed.</p>	<p>Will vary across situations. Recent information often not available.</p>	<p>a. Reduction in total morbidity and mortality b. decrease in levels of malnutrition</p>	<p>IHA reporting</p>	<p>Routine data collection and document review</p>	<p>Annually</p>	<p>MGPB Sudan IHA officer</p>
<p>2. Men, women and their households increase subsistence agriculture production, are more resilient and cope better with the physical, nutritional and economic risks and vulnerabilities related to ongoing instability.</p>	<p>KPIs a. # of men and women initiating or contributing to household or community livelihood activities b. level of production, new crops Other c. status of farming cooperatives, available organizations d. # of instances where partners engage GoS/GRSS on policy issues</p>	<p>Note 1: Data for these indicators will be drawn from pre and post intervention focus groups and surveys and from project knowledge development and exchange activities and products.</p>	<p>a. Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010 b. Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010 c. new farming cooperatives established or existing organizations strengthened d partners engage GoS/GRSS on policy issues at least once a year</p>	<p>Project reporting (FAO/UNIDO/IFAD, UNDP + others)</p>	<p>Routine data collection and document review</p>	<p>Annually</p>	<p>Sudan Analyst Team (with PTL/field support)</p>

²⁰³ Data collection and monitoring of results for food security and youth programming may be concentrated on targeted geographic areas, once these are determined by the Program.

²⁰⁴ Where there are more than 2 indicators identified, we have indicated which indicators are Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). KPIs are the primary indicators that will be used to monitor and assess progress. Each result will have no more than two KPIs. Data on the "other" indicators will be used as appropriate to complement the data on the KPIs or substitute if data from the KPIs is insufficient to demonstrate progress or lack thereof.

EXPECTED RESULTS	INDICATORS ²⁰³	BASELINE DATA	TARGETS	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION METHODS	FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBILITY
3. At risk young males and females and girls and boys aged 12-24 increase their social and economic contributions to their communities and are better able to cope and manage risks and vulnerabilities related to ongoing instability.	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. # of young people initiating or contributing to household or community livelihood and social development activities (sex disaggregated) people</p> <p>b. # of reintegrated child/youth ex-combatants (sex disaggregated)</p> <p>Other</p> <p>c. status/level of social activities available for young</p> <p>d.# of trainers/youth workers/organizations initiating new programs or expanding on existing ones</p> <p>e.# of instances where partners engage GoS/GRSS on policy issues</p>	See note 1 above.	<p>a. Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010</p> <p>b. Social activities for young people are initiated or further developed</p> <p>c. Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010</p> <p>d. Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010</p> <p>e. partners engage GoS/GRSS on policy issues at least once a year</p>	Project reporting (UNICEF, UNDP); field reporting	Routine data collection and document review	Annually	Sudan Analyst Team (with PTL/field support)
4. State institutions and Sudanese women, men, young males and females are better able to execute and actively participate in democratic processes and manage public resources.	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. Degree to which democratic processes (elections, referendum) are executed</p> <p>b. Status of GRSS payroll reform</p> <p>Other</p> <p>c. % of voter participation (sex disaggregated) in election, referendum</p> <p>d. Corruption Perception Index</p>	<p>a. Election postponed twice, scheduled for 2010. Referendum scheduled for 2011. Voter registration on-going in November 2009.</p> <p>b. Payroll reform conducted in Ministry of Education</p> <p>c. 1.5 (2009).</p> <p>d. no baseline available.</p>	<p>a. Elections and referendum executed with acceptable levels of violence.</p> <p>b. Payroll reform rolled out in additional ministries</p> <p>c. Improvement from current ranking</p> <p>d. 50% of men and women participate</p>	WoG/field reporting; project reporting; project knowledge development and exchange data ²⁰⁵ ; (UNDP, JDT/CBTF); Transparency International	Routine data collection and document review	Annually	Sudan Analyst Team (with PTL/field support)
IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES	KPIs						
1. Increased access to basic life-saving services (e.g. water, sanitation, health care, shelter and protection) by male and female IDPs, refugees and other crisis-affected populations.	<p>a. # of men and women reached by humanitarian assistance</p> <p>b. % of total vulnerable population reached by humanitarian assistance</p>	Will vary across situations and time.	All accessible populations in need have been reached.	WFP, UN, NGOs and Red Cross consolidated reports	Routine data collection	Annually	MGPB Sudan IHA officer
2. a) Increased knowledge, skills and resources (e.g. seeds, tools, access to land) among women and men (including ex-combatants, returnees and young people) to engage in sustainable subsistence agricultural production and access local marketing opportunities.	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. Level of knowledge/skills among vulnerable men and women</p> <p>b. # of resources (tools, seeds, etc.) distributed</p>	See note 1 above.	Increased knowledge/skills among beneficiaries; target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010	Project reporting (FAO, etc.)	Survey of sample vulnerable men and women participants; routine data collection	Annually	PTLs

²⁰⁵ All projects over CAD 1Million will have a knowledge development and exchange component built into them as part of the project, especially larger signature projects with multi-lateral agencies like UNICEF, UNDP and FAO, for example. This budget line item will also include more objective / formal monitoring and summative evaluations. Note: There is Treasury Board approved clause that can be part of Grant Arrangements with multi-lateral agencies, which indicates that monitoring and evaluation can be funded from ODA funds.

EXPECTED RESULTS	INDICATORS ²⁰³	BASELINE DATA	TARGETS	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION METHODS	FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBILITY
2. b) Improved understanding among targeted government ministries and non-government organizations on effective approaches to deliver support (e.g. seeds, tools, technical assistance) for conflict and gender sensitive and environmentally sustainable agricultural production to vulnerable men and women.	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. types and # of services/programs delivered to vulnerable men and women</p> <p>b. Status of gender/environment content in programs</p> <p>Other</p> <p>c. # of trainers trained</p> <p>d. # of government and NGOs engaged in training and knowledge exchange</p>	Zero – programming not yet underway	Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010; evidence of some gender/environment content in programming	Project reporting (FAO, etc.)	Routine data collection; document review of program plans	Annually	PTLs
3. a) Increased knowledge, skills and resources among at risk young males and females, girls and boys aged 12-24, in order to protect themselves, cope with vulnerability and make productive contributions to society (e.g. employment, livelihoods, leadership, reproductive health, numeracy and literacy).	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. Level of knowledge/skills among at-risk male and female youth</p> <p>b. # of resources (tools, seeds, etc) distributed</p>	See note 1 above.	Increased knowledge/skills among beneficiaries; target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010	Project reporting (UNICEF, etc.)	Survey of at-risk youth participants; routine data collection	Annually	PTLs
3. b) Improved understanding among targeted government ministries and non-government organization son effective support to delivery conflict and gender sensitive services to at risk young males and females, girls and boys.	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. types and # of services/programs delivered to males and female youth</p> <p>b. Status of gender/environment content in programs</p> <p>Other</p> <p>c. # of trainers trained</p>	Zero – programming not yet underway	Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010; evidence of some gender/environment content in programming	Project reporting (UNICEF, etc.)	Routine data collection; document review of program plans	Annually	PTLs
4. a) Enhanced understanding of the role of citizens in legitimate democratic process (e.g., elections, referendum), by Sudanese women, men and young people).	<p>KPIs</p> <p>Level of understanding of democratic processes indicated by citizens</p>	See note 1 above.	Increased understanding of democratic processes by beneficiaries	Project reporting (UNDP)	Survey of sample civic and voter education participants	Annually	PTL
4. b) Strengthened technical understanding of effective practices for managing public resources and legitimate democratic processes (e.g. elections, referendum) by targeted government ministries, public servants civil society organizations.	<p>KPIs</p> <p>a. # of Juba Compact commitments fulfilled by GRSS</p> <p>b. Status of election/referendum planning</p>	<p>a. Juba Compact established in Spring 2009</p> <p>b. Election planning behind schedule; referendum planning not yet underway</p>	<p>a. Progress on all Juba Compact commitments by 2011</p> <p>b. Progress on election/referendum planning</p>	JDT/field reporting	Routine data collection/reporting; meetings	Annually	Sudan Analyst Team
<p>OUTPUTS</p> <p>1. Emergency food aid and other non-food humanitarian assistance (e.g. water, sanitation, health care, shelter and protection) delivered to male and female IDPs, refugees and other crisis-affected populations.</p>	<p>a. amount of necessary life-saving commodities (ie. food, medical supplies, shelter materials) delivered.</p> <p>b. level of needed life-saving services (ie. water & sanitation, emergency medical support, protection) made available.</p>	Will vary across situations. Often zero.	Life-saving needs of conflict-affected populations have been met	WFP, UN, NGOs and Red Cross consolidated reports	Routine data collection	Annually	MGPB Sudan IHA officer

EXPECTED RESULTS	INDICATORS ²⁰³	BASELINE DATA	TARGETS	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION METHODS	FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBILITY
2. a) Knowledge, skills and physical resources (e.g., tools, seeds) related to subsistence agricultural and food production and marketing are delivered to women, men, and youth, including ex-combatants and returnees, in a conflict sensitive and gender relevant manner.	# of vulnerable men and women reached through programming	Zero – programming not yet underway	Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010	Project reporting (FAO, etc.)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTLs
2. b) Support provided to target government and non-government organizations on effective approaches to deliver sustainable, conflict and gender sensitive subsistence agricultural production and marketing assistance to men, women and young males and females.	# of institutions (including women's groups) engaged by project partners	Zero – programming not yet underway	Evidence of some institutions (including women's groups) engaged	Project reporting (FAO, etc.)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTLs
3. a) Training on basic education, employment and livelihood skills provided to at risk young women, men, girls and boys aged 12-24.	# of at-risk children/youth trained through programming	Zero – programming not yet underway	Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010	Project reporting (UNICEF, etc.)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTLs
3. b) Social services, including counselling, leadership development, and tailored health assistance, provided to at risk young women, men, girls and boys aged 12-24.	# of at-risk children/youth reached through programming	Zero – programming not yet underway	Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010	Project reporting (UNICEF, etc.)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTLs
3. c) Support (technical assistance, training) provided to youth-centered government ministries and non-government organizations on delivering gender and conflict sensitive services to young women, men, girls and boys aged 12-24.	# of institutions (including women's groups) engaged by project partners	Zero – programming not yet underway	Evidence of some institutions (including women's groups) engaged	Project reporting (UNICEF, etc.)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTLs
4. a) Public education on democratic processes (e.g., elections referendum) delivered to Sudanese women and men and young people.	# of men and women reached through civic and voter education activities	Majority of Sudanese will be first-time voters	Target to be determined in consultation with UNDP	Project reporting (UNDP)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTL
4. b) Support (technical assistance, training, mentoring) on the management of public resources and democratic processes delivered to targeted government ministries, public servants and civil society government and non-government organizations.	# of GRSS ministries/public servants receiving technical assistance	To be confirmed with JDT	Target to be determined by partners in Q1 of 2010	Project reporting (JDO/CBTF; UNDP)	Routine data collection	Annually	PTLs

Annex 11 – Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) – Global Peace and Security Fund Projects in Sudan and South Sudan from 2009/10-2013/14 (CAD)

* note – projects highlighted in blue began prior to the independence of South Sudan in July, 2011. Consequently, prior to 2011 projects in blue would have been operating in the Autonomous Region of Southern Sudan, but would later be operating in South Sudan as of July, 2011.

Project Name	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Geographic Coverage of Project Operations ²⁰⁶	Project Total Disbursement	Principal thematic priority
Strengthening arms controls and community security in Southern Sudan	20/10/2006	30/06/2012	SOUTH	2,015,056.00	Community Security and Arms Control
Community Security and Arms Control, Southern Sudan	19/03/2010	15/09/2011	SOUTH	5,029,696.00	Community Security and Arms Control
Assisting the Process of Prison Reform in Southern Sudan (Phase III)	16/12/2010	31/08/2013	SOUTH	2,203,430.00	Corrections
Assisting the Process of Prison Reform in Southern Sudan (Phase II)	09/02/2009	31/12/2010	SOUTH	2,135,206.00	Corrections
Rule of Law Assistance to returnees to Southern Sudan	18/02/2008	30/06/2010	SOUTH	1,016,940.13	Justice
Promoting Rule of Law in Southern Sudan Phase II	23/09/2009	31/08/2012	SOUTH	5,424,580.00	Justice
Supporting Constitutional and Legislative Reform in Post-referendum Southern Sudan	08/03/2011	30/06/2013	SOUTH	2,684,088.00	Justice
Supporting Negotiations on Post-referendum issues in the Sudan: Addressing Legal issues	02/02/2011	30/06/2011	SOUTH	54,405.00	Mediation and Peace Processes
Political Officer, Assessment and Evaluation Commission	12/05/2009	31/03/2011	?	56,550.94	Mediation and Peace Processes
Clearance of Cluster Munition Sites in Central and Eastern Equatoria, Southern Sudan	17/09/2009	30/04/2010	SOUTH	1,011,123.00	Mine Action / E.R.W.
Danish Demining Group (DDG) Clearance of Cluster Munitions and ERW Sites in Southern Sudan	20/07/2010	30/06/2012	SOUTH	841,191.88	Mine Action / E.R.W.
Promotion of sustainable development in southern Sudan by reducing the threat of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) through land release in Eastern Equatoria, southern Sudan	17/09/2010	31/05/2012	SOUTH	850,000.00	Mine Action / E.R.W.
Threat Definition and Community Liaison/ Mine Risk Education in support of Returnees in Central and Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan	14/11/2008	15/12/2009	SOUTH	460,539.88	Mine Action / E.R.W.
Capacity Development of the South Sudan Mine Action Authority (SSMAA)	15/03/2011	31/03/2013	SOUTH	1,750,000.00	Mine Action / E.R.W.
Enhancing Peace and Community Stability in Eastern Equatoria State and Jonglei State, Southern Sudan	09/03/2009	30/11/2010	SOUTH	3,630,636.00	Peacebuilding
Preparing Southern Sudan for 2011 and Beyond	01/06/2010	15/09/2011	SOUTH	400,068.00	Peacebuilding
Referendum Security - SSPS Communication Equipment	30/09/2010	31/12/2012	SOUTH	3,743,179.69	Police and Security Forces
South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) Partners Coordination Meeting	08/12/2010	31/03/2011	SOUTH	46,425.82	Police and Security Forces
Capacity Building for Land Conflict Management in South Sudan	29/04/2010	31/07/2012	SOUTH	2,135,101.00	Resources and Conflict
Capacity Building to Address Security and Terrorism Threat at Juba International Airport in the Republic of South Sudan	20/10/2011	31/03/2013	SOUTH	1,304,447.00	Police and Security Forces
Humanitarian mine action in South Sudan	19/07/2012	31/03/2013	SOUTH	494,093.00	Mine Action / E.R.W.

²⁰⁶ The options include: Project operations in **North** (refer to Sudan – post July 2011 or the northern part of Sudan-prior to July 2011); **South** (refer to either South Sudan – post July 2011 or the Autonomous Region of Southern Sudan – prior to July 2011); or **North/South** (refer to project operations in both Sudan and South Sudan – post July 2011, or Sudan and the Autonomous Region of Southern Sudan respectively – prior to July 2011).

South Sudan Decentralization Support Program	08/01/2013	31/03/2013	SOUTH	316,009.80	Outreach and Advocacy
Enabling Sustainable Peace in Jonglei State, South Sudan	12/10/2012	31/03/2013	?	339,721.34	Peacebuilding
Protection, Preventing of Sexual Violence and Conflict Resolution through Strengthened Capacity of Communities and Government in Warrap, South Sudan	07/11/2012	31/03/2013	SOUTH	318,383.00	Peacebuilding
Community Stabilization and Peace through capacity building in Jonglei State, South Sudan	03/12/2012	31/03/2013	SOUTH	339,660.00	Peacebuilding
Enabling Sustainable Peace in Jonglei State, South Sudan	12/10/2012	31/03/2013	SOUTH	339,721.34	Peacebuilding
Police Communications Capacity Building Project - Phase II	08/08/2012	31/03/2013	SOUTH	2,376,090.00	Police and Security Forces
Federal Governance & Peace in Sudan – Phase 2	28/08/2008	15/02/2011	NORTH/ SOUTH	1,971,854.00	Mediation and Peace Processes
Support to Federal Decentralization Policy and Negotiations in Sudan	20/01/2011	19/12/2011	NORTH/ SOUTH	562,001.00	Mediation and Peace Processes
International Crisis Group- Sudan Project	18/12/2009	30/06/2010	NORTH/ SOUTH	126,039.00	Outreach and Advocacy
Support to North and South Sudan DDR Commissions	17/12/2009	31/12/2012	NORTH/ SOUTH	431,378.32	Police and Security Forces
Security System Reform and Peacebuilding in Sudan	29/11/2007	30/11/2009	NORTH/ SOUTH	72,783.00	Police and Security Forces
Darfur Humanitarian Mediation Programme	04/03/2011	31/03/2013	NORTH ONLY	850,078.00	Peacebuilding
Sexual and Gender Based Violence Training for UNAMID	23/08/2010	19/12/2011	NORTH ONLY	464,767.00	Peacebuilding
Preparatory Support Project for DDR in Darfur	09/02/2010	31/08/2012	NORTH ONLY	1,000,000.00	Mediation and Peace Processes
Enhancing Peace and Security addressing Clusters and ERW Threats in Blue Nile, Sudan	22/09/2009	14/01/2011	NORTH ONLY	261,251.80	Mine Action / E.R.W.
Enhancing Peace and Security Addressing Clusters and ERW Threats in Blue Nile, Sudan*	27/09/2010	30/06/2011	NORTH ONLY	300,000.00	Mine Action / E.R.W.