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Bid Fax: (819) 997-9776

SOLICITATION AMENDMENT

MODIFICATION DE L'INVITATION

The referenced document is hereby revised; unless otherwise indicated, all other terms and conditions of the Solicitation remain the same.

Ce document est par la présente révisé; sauf indication contraire, les modalités de l'invitation demeurent les mêmes.

Comments - Commentaires

Vendor/Firm Name and Address

**Raison sociale et adresse du
fournisseur/de l'entrepreneur**

Issuing Office - Bureau de distribution

**Armoured Vehicles Support/Soutien des véhicules
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11 Laurier St./11, rue Laurier

Place du Portage Phase III 6C1

Gatineau

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K1A 0S5

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|--|---|
| Title - Sujet Next Generation Fighting Vehicle | |
| Solicitation No. - N° de l'invitation W6399-19KH53/A | Amendment No. - N° modif. 003 |
| Client Reference No. - N° de référence du client W6399-19KH53 | Date 2019-08-19 |
| GETS Reference No. - N° de référence de SEAG PW-\$\$BL-319-27400 | |
| File No. - N° de dossier 319bl.W6399-19KH53 | CCC No./N° CCC - FMS No./N° VME |
| Solicitation Closes - L'invitation prend fin at - à 02:00 PM on - le 2019-09-06 | |
| F.O.B. - F.A.B. Plant-Usine: <input type="checkbox"/> Destination: <input type="checkbox"/> Other-Autre: <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Address Enquiries to: - Adresser toutes questions à: Ferron, Nathalie | Buyer Id - Id de l'acheteur 319bl |
| Telephone No. - N° de téléphone (819) 420-0840 () | FAX No. - N° de FAX () - |
| Destination - of Goods, Services, and Construction: Destination - des biens, services et construction: N/A | |

Instructions: See Herein

Instructions: Voir aux présentes

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| Delivery Required - Livraison exigée | Delivery Offered - Livraison proposée |
| Vendor/Firm Name and Address Raison sociale et adresse du fournisseur/de l'entrepreneur | |
| Telephone No. - N° de téléphone Facsimile No. - N° de télécopieur | |
| Name and title of person authorized to sign on behalf of Vendor/Firm (type or print) Nom et titre de la personne autorisée à signer au nom du fournisseur/ de l'entrepreneur (taper ou écrire en caractères d'imprimerie) | |
| Signature | Date |

AMENDMENT 003

This Request for Information amendment (003) is raised to provide clarifications sought by Industry and to extend the closing date of the RFI.

Questions and Answers:

Question 5: HLMR 1 and HLMR 3 infers the NGFV must have base level 1 ballistic armour protection with the ability to add additional protection to level 3. We suggest level 1 is an unrealistically low level armour in a threat environment. For comparison VIP cars and some police vehicles in major international cities have higher protection than level 1. Providing level 1 armour also adds parasitic weight to the vehicle platform compared to directly adding a higher protection level armour to an otherwise non-armoured vehicle. It should also be noted that transparent armour is unlikely to be available as a scalable solution, necessitating a higher base transparent armour level being installed on all vehicles. Will Canada consider changing the base level armour requirement?

Answer 5: While HLMR #1 – Survivability stipulates that the protection level is to be scalable from a STANAG 4569 level 1 to 3, Canada is open to the concept of starting from an open capsule or non-armoured vehicle up to the mandatory STANAG level 3. This can be discussed during the Industry Demonstration period. Canada understands that the transparent armour may not be scalable.

The vision of employment of this vehicle is primarily in the Direct Action (DA) role; however, Canada would see value in maximizing the vehicle's capability to conduct Special Reconnaissance (SR). This implies that the ideal vehicle would provide scalability and protection levels in order to accommodate various mission sets ranging from highly protected short duration DAs to minimally protected, maximizing payload and situational awareness.

We are exploring how much of the SR capability can be achieved without compromising on the DA requirements. In terms of blast protection scalability, Canada is interested in industry feedback, recognizing the technical challenges of blast protection scalability.

Question 6: HLMR 3 and the response to Question 1 in Amendment 001 provides information about payload. In view of the foregoing question, please advise the required ultimate available vehicle payload after accounting for the weight of the 4 occupants, the RWS and the level 3 ballistic protection?

Answer 6: Canada is seeking Industry's response on the payload that corresponds to the varying protection levels being proposed by their NGFV solution, noting that the minimum payload is 3000 kg less the RWS, vehicle occupants and the weight associated with the scalable armour required for STANAG 4569 level 3 protection.

Question 7: HLMR 8 requires a proven in-service vehicle. Will Canada be more specific in the description to require the vehicle be in service with a special forces user?

Answer 7: Canada values reliability and believes that HLMR #8 – Reliability achieves this without specifying a SOF user.

Question 8: While it is understood the RFI contains high level requirements, HLMR 3 provides a vague description of the terrain that the vehicle will be employed. Will Canada specify a high level of mobility commensurate with other NATO and Australian SOF users?

Answer 8: HLMR #3 – Mobility establishes the mobility baseline based on the Canadian requirements that may mirror other NATO SOF but will be based on unique Canadian mobility performance requirements, which will be detailed in the Request for Proposal (RFP). Canada will look to gain insight into the vehicles' mobility characteristics during the Industry Demonstration week.

Question 9: Is commonality and/or interoperability with other SOF users within NATO and Australia desirable through increased mobility (i.e. ability to get to the same locations), commonality of parts and maintainability, ability to operate other nations vehicles with no training?

Answer 9: As stated in A8, Canada will have mobility requirements that, in some aspects, mirror other SOF NATO nations' but will be based on unique Canadian mobility performance requirements. Commonality of parts and maintainability, while desirable, are not essential elements of this procurement. Canada has no requirement to specify training commonality amongst NATO partners.

Question 10: It is assumed that due to the proposed employment concept of NGFV (Counter Terrorism & High Value Task Operations), will Canada require maximum modularity between platforms, i.e. the ability to mount different cameras and sensors or weapon systems (alongside the RWS) or to have different variants (e.g. Reconnaissance, logistics, fighting, mortar, ambulance, recovery etc.)?

Answer 10: As stated in HLMR #4 – Electrical Architecture, Canada requires an electrical architecture that is compliant with Generic Vehicle Architecture as per STANAG 4754 and sufficient exportable power that enables future integration of sensors, cameras, and other sub-systems.

Currently, Canada sees the employment of two variants; one being the fighting variant that is scalable and adaptable to different mission sets; and the second being a logistics variant. Canada is interested in understanding the logistics variants offered by each company.

Question 11: As you are aware the majority of Euro based businesses are closed for at least 3 weeks in August. This leaves almost no time to adequately prepare a response by your requested closing date of August 23. We are writing to request a two week extension to the closing date of the subject LOI. We look forward to your favourable response.

Answer 11: Canada agrees to the request to extend the closing date of the RFI. The new closing date will be 6 September 2019.

**ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE REQUEST OF INFORMATION REMAIN
UNCHANGED**