

STATEMENT OF WORK

Defining the Right Narrative for Land Power at Departmental Level

1.0 SCOPE

- 1.1 The Canadian Army (CA) is seeking to define the problem(s) associated with its difficulty in communicating its cost of business, particularly from an equipment support perspective at the departmental senior governance level. The CA requires feedback from an independent professional services entity, specifically a Business Consultant, on how to better articulate in simple and resonating terms its mandate of providing ‘Land Power’ and the costs associated with doing its business. For the purpose of this consultation, land power is, as defined in the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy, the ability to exert control within the land environment and influence the behaviour of actors and the environment. Land power can also be viewed as “military strength or as “control of time, space, and the sources of power of an opponent by taking and protecting land and hurting the enemy by doing so. Land power provides national policymakers with the capability to destroy the enemy’s ability to be an independent political player in opposition to our will and suffers from the effects of friction, uncertainty, and danger to a greater degree than other sources of national military power. Its costs cannot be ascertained ahead of time, but it provides the most definitive act in furtherance of national policy objectives” (extrapolation from Dr Lukas Milewski Fortissimus Inter Pares Land power definition). The senior level governance targeted are initially for the National Procurement (NP) Oversight Committee (NPOC), the Programme Management Boards (PMB) and ultimately for the Investment and Resource Management Committee (IRMC). The services of the Business Consultant are to include advising CA senior management on a range of issues affecting the CA’s ability to achieve its business objectives, identifying opportunities for and assisting in the articulation of its business requirements, as well as providing advice for improvements on how the CA best communicates its business costs, particularly from an equipment support perspective at the departmental senior governance level.


2.0 BACKGROUND

- 2.1 In time of funding scarcity, the CA struggles with explaining the costs associated with various elements of land power when compared to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), particularly when presenting the right narrative to resonate at funding boards in various senior level governance committees. Both RCAF and RCN are able to use a simple algorithm that is easily understandable for senior management not having lived their careers within that specific element. For example, the RCN has typically been able to provide its costing based on specific platforms (ships) whereby if a portion of funding is reduced, the RCN has been able to communicate its output in terms of a proportionate number of platforms. Similarly, the RCAF is able to provide its costing based on specific air platform and the corresponding impact to its air fleet if funding is reduced. They typically use the Yearly Flight Rate (YFR). Contrary to the CA’s nature, Land Power is less tied to a platform for an actual operational effect but really related to a system of systems that can make an effect alone or combined. Image 1 below provides a simplistic view of how it can be seen.

STATEMENT OF WORK

Defining the Right Narrative for Land Power at Departmental Level

Overarching Principle: Land Power is “A System of Systems”



2.2 Consequently, the CA has been unable to articulate the direct impact to operations when educations in NP budgets are being discussed. This shortfall has significantly impacted the CA in terms of funding allocations throughout the years while it struggles to maintain the ability to force generate for the Government of Canada's and the Canadian Armed Forces needs and mandates.

3.0 MANADATORY REQUIREMENTS

The Contractor shall provide to the Canadian Army:

- 3.1 A detailed report no later than 2 months after contract award containing:
 - 3.1.1 Identify the overarching problem framing and the key aggravating factors affecting the CA ability to clearly and simplistically articulate its cost of doing the mandate of producing land power;
 - 3.1.2 Provide no less than 2 distinct key narratives that would resonate outside the CA, which can be implemented within the CA HQ and used to explain land power to NPOC, PMB and IRMC and its link to equipment support costings. Of note, this should be based on the systems of record the Departmental uses such as DRMIS and BOBJ;
 - 3.1.3 Provide no less than 2 distinct methods of visualizing land power business to NPOC, PMB and IRMC and its inherent costs;
 - 3.1.4 Provide perceived challenges, barriers and risks to implementing these narratives;
 - 3.1.5 Provide suggested opportunities and solutions in reducing challenges and barriers bearing in mind the strategic context the Department currently lives in;
 - 3.1.6 Provide a proposed plan and detailed timeline for pre-activities in communicating with key stakeholders prior key meetings such as NPOC and IRMC for interim activities based on Government of Canada funding timelines

STATEMENT OF WORK

Defining the Right Narrative for Land Power at Departmental Level

- 3.2 The contractor must have Director-General level or Executive level experience, ideally at the Chief of Programme (C Prog) level, and experience with the following meetings/committees:
 - 3.2.1 Defence Capabilities Board (DCB);
 - 3.2.2 Programme Management Board (PMB);
 - 3.2.3 Armed Forces Management Board (AFMB); and
 - 3.2.4 Investment and Resource Management Committee (IRMC)
- 3.3 The contractor must not have an Army background.
- 3.4 The contractor must provide a minimum of 2 references in order to verify the above requirements.

4.0 CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES

- 4.1 Request for interviews of key personnel
 - 4.1.1 Requests must be submit at a minimum 1 week in advance;
 - 4.1.2 Interviews must occur on Department of National Defense (DND) premises; and
 - 4.1.3 All info collected in interviews will remain the property of DND and is not be used outside this contract.
- 4.2 Access to Data
 - 4.2.1 Contractor must obtain and provide proof or reliability security clearance; and
 - 4.2.2 Request for access to any and all analytic software to be provided during contract submission.
- 4.3 Report printing/ formatting
 - 4.3.1 Contractor is responsible for all production of report both electronic and paper.

5.0 CANADIAN ARMED FORCES RESPONSIBILITIES

- 5.1 Provide Confirmation of interview timings to Contractor no later than 48 hours in advance
- 5.2 Facilitate access to data and analytic software as requested by contractor
- 5.1 Facilitate access to DND facilities for interviews
- 5.2 Provide situation brief on current methods and messaging model for Canadian Army Land Power
- 5.3 The following outlines the project team
 - 5.3.1 Project Leader – Deputy Commander CA – MGen MacAulay
 - 5.3.2 Project Director – CA G4 Systems – LCol Thangarasu
 - 5.3.3 Project Manager – CA G4 DRMIS – Maj MacDonald
 - 5.3.4 Project Procurement – CA G4 Contracts – Carol-Ann Renaud
 - 5.3.5 Other key stakeholders - COS Army OPS – BGen Major, COS Army Strategic – BGen Ayotte, Army Training Authority (ATA) – MGen Cadden, Director Army

STATEMENT OF WORK

Defining the Right Narrative for Land Power at Departmental Level

Strategic (DAS) – Col Murphy, CA Comptroller – Col Mallette, CA G3 – Col Harvey